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Commercial Common Law, the United 
Nations Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods, and the Inertia of Habit 
David Frisch· 
This Article develops a model of judicial behavior that rests on the idea that a judge's 
decision is a fanction of her attitudes and role orientations and these, in turn, are heavily 
influenced by her law school education. The result is an intellectual stubbornness that may lead 
judges to reject not only optional innovations that may present themselves, but may also cause 
them to construe mandatory provisions as if no change had occurred. This model and the 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods illustrate situations in which the emerging 
international commercial code may play an important role in the development of damestic law. 
Although it has been accepted that international instruments have the potential to help shape 
the law on a damestic level, this phenomenon has only been discussed in the context of 
legislation. However, these instruments may also exert an influence on the behavior of judges 
greater than is commonly supposed. For it is surely the case that, in creating a new legal 
environment for decision making, international instruments are bound to mediate existing 
intellectual habits and encourage experimentation and growth in cases withaut an international 
character. An effort to ensure a clear understanding of this sort would count as one among a 
wide range of steps to build a framework within which international law can develop without 
unexpectedly disturbing the damestic legal system. 
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Taught law is tough law. 1 
Codification, particularly since the formulation of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC or the Code) and its enactment throughout 
the United States,2 has increasingly become the preferred method of 
shaping the development of commercial law.3 Aside from the process 
of periodic adjustments in existing UCC articles to reflect deepgoing 
changes in society,4 there have been several instances where 
supplementary articles have been enacted as formal amendments to the 
Code.5 For example, computers, reader-sorter machines, image 
processors, and other technological advances have given rise to new 
paperless systems of high-value wire credit transfers.6 One possible 
1. See FREDERIC WU.LIAM MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE 25 
(1901). 
2. After the Code's initial adoption by Pennsylvania in 1953, nationwide enactment 
was temporarily halted when it was criticized by the New York Law Revision Commission 
and temporarily rejected by that state. See Walter D. Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial 
Code, in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK 1, 5-6 (American Bar Ass'n 1964). It was 
not until the 1957 Official Text of the Code was enacted by Massachusetts that its prospects 
brightened. See id. at 7-8. Today the Code, in one form or another, is the law in all 50 states, 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
3. To be sure, this is not an altogether new phenomenon. The Code supplanted 
uniform acts that were drafted and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) over the course of half a century, including the 
Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, the 
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the Uniform Conditional 
Sales Act, and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. See U.C.C. general cmt. {1998). 
4. Within the past decade, the NCCUSL and the American Law Institute (ALI) have 
revised articles 3 (1990), 4 (1990), 5 (1995), 6 (1989), 8 (1994), and 9 (1998). See U.C.C. 
preface (1998). Drafting committees are currently revising articles 1, 2, and 2A. Although 
the particular impetus for each revision project has been somewhat different, the basic 
objective has always been to prevent the Code from becoming outdated. For example, since 
the promulgation of the 1957 Official Text of the Code, article 2 (Sales) has remained 
virtually unchanged. The same cannot be said, however, of commercial and consumer law 
generally and the technological environment in which many transactions now take place. 
Some of the more obvious changes include the common-law development of a theory of 
strict products liability that overlaps the Code, the enactment of a ''hodgepodge of [federal 
and state] consumer protection legislation," and the growing use of electronic methods of 
contracting. Edith Resnick Warkentine, Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect 
Consumers and "Merchant/Consumers" Through Default Provisions, 30 J. MARsHALL L. 
REv. 39, 78 (1996). When one also considers the vast number of judicial opinions that have 
revealed weaknesses in the current statutory structure, it would not be unreasonable to 
conclude that article 2 may be in need of revision. 
5. See, e.g., U.C.C. arts. 2A, 4A (1998). 
6. See id. art. 4A prefatory note. 
1999] INERTIA OF HABIT 497 
response to this development might be to leave the task of making 
"law'' to the marketplace, specifically to the financial players that 
currently rely on this type of payment system, and to a slowly 
developing common law.7 fustead, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American 
Law fustitute (ALI) added a new article 4A to the Code in order to 
respond to uneven or unwelcome common law developments. 8 The 
NCCUSL and the ALI believed that courts were uncertain as to 
whether analogies to other payment mechanisms such as negotiable 
instruments could be appropriately employed to determine the 
outcome of a funds transfer case. ''The result is a great deal of 
uncertainty. There is no consensus about the juridical nature of a wire 
transfer and consequently of the rights and obligations that are 
created.'>9 
In addition to these efforts to keep the Code responsive to 
contemporary needs, legislatures have also reacted to change by 
enacting auxiliary statutes covering only limited subjects that are not 
consolidated into the Code. In 1996, for example, recognizing that 
electronic commerce can be improperly impeded by inappropriate law 
and that the impact of new technologies extends beyond the scope of 
the Code to other types of transactions, the NCCUSL established the 
Drafting Committee on Electronic Communications in Contractual 
Transactions, later renamed the Drafting Committee on the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act (UETA). The original charge to this 
committee was ''to draft such revisions to general contract law as are 
Id. 
The dollar volume of payments made by wire transfer far exceeds the dollar 
volume of payments made by other means. The volume of payments by wire 
transfer over the two principal wire payment systems-the Federal Reserve wire 
transfer network (Fedwire) and the New York Clearing House Interbank Payments 
Systems (CHIPS}-exceeds one trillion dollars per day. 
7. It has been suggested that ''there is no real jurisprudence of wire transfer law." 
Raj Bhala, 17ze Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KY. L.J. 347, 349 (1993). If 
Professor Bhala is correct, might it not be preferable to permit a common-law jurisprudence 
to develop than to draft a statute before the subject matter has attained a sufficient antecedent 
conceptual formulation and integration? 
8. For example, the article 4A drafting committee took issue with leading cases 
such as Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955-59 (7th Cir. 1982), which held 
that consequential damages could be awarded if a bank, with notice of particular 
circumstances giving rise to damages, refuses to execute a payment order. The result is a 
statutory provision that bars consequential damages unless the bank expressly assumes, in 
writing, such liability. See U.C.C. § 4A-305 cmt. 2 (1998). The first of these "new" articles 
added to the Code was article 2A. This article governs personal property leases and was 
initially approved by the NCCUSL and the ALI in 1987. It was subsequently amended in 
1990 and is being revised again to bring it into conformity with the revisions to article 2. 
9. U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note (1998). 
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necessary or desirable to support transaction processes utilizing 
existing and future electronic or computerized technologies."10 The 
committee completed its work in 1999. This project represents 
another example of codification of a commercial law subject for which 
no previously developed body of clear concepts exists.11 
Looking to international developments, a strong movement has 
developed during the latter half of the twentieth century favoring the 
worldwide unification and hannonization of commercial law. There 
are essentially three principal methods by which this goal is being 
accomplished. First, a measure of such hannonization can be, and has 
been, brought about by private endeavor. The latest version of the 
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP) 
prepared by the futemational Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1993 is 
an example of this category.12 This expression of private commercial 
norms can become effective as the "law'' governing a letter of credit 
transaction only if viewed as a binding source of trade usage or if 
"incorporated in~o the text of the Credit."13 
10. Memorandum from the Drafting Committee for Electronic Communications in 
Contractual Transactions, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to 
Scope and Program Committee (Jan. 3, 1997) (as approved by the Scope and Program 
Committee and the Executive Committee of the Conference) (on file with author). 
11. Another recent effort to statutorily preempt burgeoning case law is the aborted 
project to draft a new article 2B of the Code. This article would have governed all contracts 
for the sale, licensing, development, distribution, maintenance, documentation, and support 
of computer software. fustead of incorporating this uniform law within the Code as 
originally planned, the NCCUSL recently decided that it would be more appropriate to 
promulgate the rules for adoption by the states as the Uniform Computer fuformation 
Transactions Act (UCITA). For a brief history of article 2B and the reasons why the project 
was transformed into the UCITA, see Fred H. Miller & Carlyle C. Ring, Article 2B s New 
Unifonn: A Free-Standing Computer Infonnation Transactions Act, UCC BULL., June 1999, 
at 1, 2-4. See also National Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Committee 
Drafting New Article 2B of Unifonn Commercial Code Makes Major Changes to Protect 
Consumers and Small Businesses, and to Safeguard Public Interests in Free Speech and Fair 
Criticism in the Electronic Age (Nov. 17, 1998) (visited Oct. 11, 1999) 
<http://www.2bguide.com/docs/prsrl 198.html> (press release) ("Article 2B can be a strong 
first step toward a common legal framework for digital information and software licenses."); 
infra text accompanying notes 68-73. Not everyone, however, shares the NCCUSL's 
optimism. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Sign It and Weep, INDUSTRY STANDARD, para. 2 (Nov. 
20, 1998) <http://www.thestandard.com/articles/display/0,1449,2583,00.html> (''The current 
draft represents little more than the narrow commercial interests of the major software 
companies. It's an embarrassment to its sponsors, who ought to dump the draft and leave the 
topic alone."). 
12. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PuB. No. 500, ICC UNIFORM 
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993) [hereinafter UCP 500]. This 
revised a prior version published in 1983. See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, PuB. No. 511, DOCUMENTARY CR.Enrrs: UCP 500 AND 400 COMPARED (Charles 
de! Busto ed., 1993). 
13. UCP 500, supra note 12, art. 1. 
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The Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(UNIDROIT Principles or the Principles), drafted by the International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in 1994, 
exemplifies the second method.14 The Principles do not have the 
binding effect of national legislation or an international convention but 
rather are the equivalent of an "international restatement'' of the law of 
contracts. 15 In this sense, the Principles become applicable ''when the 
parties have agreed that their contract [shall] be governed by them" 
and "may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law 
instruments."16 
Finally, cooperative measures on the governmental or legislative 
level are achieving international harmonization in several important 
areas of commercial law. This is creating what might be called an 
international UCC17 covering such matters as the international sale of 
goods;18 international financial leasing;19 international factoring;20 
international bills of exchange and promissory notes;21 and 
international credit transfers, including electronic funds transfers,22 
14. UNIDROIT is an independent intergovernmental organization founded in 1926 
and headquartered in Rome. For an overview of UNIDROIT's activities, see Mario 
Matteucci, UNIDROJT: The First Fifty Years, in 1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW xvii, xvii-xviii (1977). 
15. See Ole Lando, European Contract Law, in INTERNATIONAL CoNTRACTS AND 
CoNFLicrs OF LAWS: A COLLECTION OF EssAYS 1, 7-9 (Petar Sarl!evic ed., 1990) (stating that 
the goal of the UNIDROIT project is to ''provide non-binding proposals for rules" and to 
''prepare a systematic harmonization of the law of contracts''). 
16. INTERNATIONAL INST. FOR TIIE UNIFICATION OF PRIVA1E LAW, PRINCIPLES OF INT'L 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS pmbl. (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1067, 1069 (1995). 
17. See Amelia H. Boss & Patricia B. Fry, Divergent or Parallel Tracks: 
International and Domestic Codification of Commercial Law, 47 Bus. LAW. 1505, 1506 
(1992) ("[A ]ctivities are currently under way on the international level leading to the creation 
of what might be called an 'International Uniform Commercial Code."'). 
18. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9 (1984), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter CISG]. 
19. See Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft 
UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring and International Financial Leasing, May 
28, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 927 (1988). 
20. Seeid. 
21. See Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory 
Notes, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 6th Comm., 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/43/820 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 170 (1989). 
22. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the 
Work of its Twenty-Fifth Session, 4-22 May 1992, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 17, 
Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/47117 (1992), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 587 (1993). 
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independent bank guarantees, and letters of creclit.23 Regional efforts 
to unify commercial law are also becoming commonplace.24 
What should the Code drafters do about this international 
commercial lawmaking activity? Although one of the principal 
underlying purposes and policies of the Code is ''to ·make uniform the 
law among the various jurisdictions,"25 national uniformity of 
commercial law should be viewed in relation to the ultimate goal of 
international harmonization of conflicting laws. Such harmonization 
would help surmount what has been defined as the "anarchy'' upon 
which international relationships are based.26 In other words, one of 
the greatest impediments to worldwide trade is the impact of a myriad 
of distinct domestic laws. Indeed, commentators have suggested that 
the sponsors of the Code pay attention to the international 
ramifications of the Code and the need for uniformity between 
domestic and international law.27 On the other hand, it must be 
recognized that· the attainment of national uniformity, by itself, will 
make commercial law more easily accessible and may facilitate future 
attempts at harmonization by the various international law making 
bodies.28 
Concern and debate over the extent to which commercial law on 
one level (international or domestic) should be taken into account in 
revisions of the law on the other level have, to date, been limited to the 
various "legislative" drafting projects that were recently completed or 
are presently under way.29 This conversation misleads us to think that 
23. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the 
Work of Its Twenty-Eighth Session, 4-26 May 1995, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 17, 
Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/50/17 (1995). 
24. See, e.g., Harold S. Burman, International Conflict of Laws, the 1994 Inter-
American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, and Trends for the 
1990s, 28 VAND. J. 'fRANSNAT'LL. 367, 386 (1995). 
25. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1998). 
26. See RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSI'EMS IN THE WORLD 
TODAY 9 (2d ed. 1978). 
27. See, e.g., Boss & Fry, supra note 17, at 1506-07; James E. Byrne, Fundamental 
Issues in the Unification and Harmonization of Letter of Credit Law, 37 LOY. L. REv. 1, 1-6 
(1991); Peter Winship, Domesticating International Commercial Law: Revising U.C.C. 
Article 2 in Light of the' United Nations Sales Convention, 37 LoY. L. REv. 43, 43-45 (1991). 
28. For example, it has been suggested that in the area of secured financing ''the 
impact of United States developments on the international level should be significant." 
Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship Between International 
and Domestic Law Reform, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1931, 1942 (1998). 
29. See, e.g., Henry D. Gabriel, The Inapplicability of the United Nations Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods as a Model for the Revision of Article Two of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 72 TuL. L. REY. 1995 (1998); Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC 
Article 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 165 (1995); Peter Wmship, The National 
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drafting convergence is the only issue of true importance. There is 
little dispute that the quickest and most efficient route to unification 
and harmonization is for drafting committees to coordinate 
international and domestic law; it simply cannot make sense in today's 
global economic environment to allow important legal outcomes to 
tum on national legislation so diverse that intelligent business planning 
becomes impossible. 
Neglected by writers, however, is another source of law in the 
United States-common law-that has the potential to assist the 
harmonization effort and which itself might be strengthened and 
improved by drawing upon the emerging law of international 
commercial transactions. In the current age of codification, 
commercial common law has become only a small part of the 
sprawling, complex body of commercial law, but it is an important 
part, both practically and conceptually. Practically, common law rules 
are important because, unless displaced by the Code, they supplement 
its provisions.3° Conceptually, the common law, to the extent it is 
reflective of the lex mercatoria, takes us close to the heart of what the 
Code is all about, and this in tum invites us to examine basic models 
of contract and property obligations.31 
This Article examines the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG or the 
Convention), which is arguably the greatest legislative achievement 
aimed at harmonizing the international law of sales, from the 
perspective of common-law decision making and attempts to discover 
what implications, if any, the Convention might have on fundamental 
questions concerning judicial adherence to precedent and the role of 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the International Unification of 
Private Law, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 227 (1992). 
30. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1998). 
31. It has always been understood that 
[c]ommercial law in the United States relies on the "law merchant" [See, 
e.g., U.C.C. § 1-103.] The classic work on the law merchant, Lex Mercatoria, 
makes the point that this body of authority is not one created by judges, but by the 
customs of merchants. Of course, by the late 1600s the common law lawyers and 
judges had assumed roles which previously had been performed by merchants, and 
the courts themselves declared the custom, which was incorporated as a part of the 
common law. Thus was commercial custom translated into judicial precedent, and 
commercial law, informed by commercial custom, grew as case law. Unity oflaw 
and custom has been a goal of commercial law ever since. 
Miller & Ring, supra note 11, at 2. Karl Llewellyn, in defense of the Code, stated that it 
seeks ''to remake the sales law of New York ... in order that the law may be made to 
conform to commercial practice, and may be read and make sense." I STATE OF NEW YORK, 
REPOKf OF THE LAW REVISION COMMITTEE FOR 1954 AND RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE 
UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE 113 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 NEW YORK COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
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courts in the evolution of commercial law.32 More specifically, 
commercial law Gudicially based or- statutory) should rest on a set of 
real-world practices and expectations. When these expectations and 
practices change, there should be a careful reworking and 
modernization of traditional and archaic legal concepts. Once the 
relationship between changing commercial practices and the 
development of the law is understood, judicial legislation can be 
shown to pose no significant challenge to the general legitimacy and 
meaningfulness of the doctrine of stare decisis.33 
Part I briefly reviews the basic arguments against using the CISG 
as a model for the revision of article 2 of the Code. These arguments 
are evaluated to detennine if they would also caution against courts 
drawing on the CISG in formulating common-law rules. The analysis 
seeks to show that the CISG should not be viewed as an inherently 
hostile influence on courts deciding domestic cases. 
Part II explains that the law-as originally taught to and learned 
by judges-creates habits of thought not easily broken. These habits 
are not troublesome merely because they significantly influence the 
process by which principles and policies are fashioned into standards 
of decision; rather, habits can force courts to act as guardians of a past 
that may no longer be relevant.34 Accordingly, courts cannot be relied 
upon to carefully develop incremental solutions to important problems 
and to effectuate legislative will. Eventually, however, legislative 
changes will be able to exert a meaningful influence on even the most 
intellectually stubborn judge, and new habits will develop. 
The remainder of Part II seeks to discover the force of habit in 
three Code cases. The concern is not whether the particular decision is 
normatively correct. The cases are used to demonstrate an approach 
that contributes to, and is inherent in, the judicial process. 
32. For a brief overview of the drafting history of the CISG, see infra note 35 and 
accompanying text. Although the discussion centers around the CISG, it applies with equal 
force to any international instrument. The CISG was chosen because it covers a wide and 
important area of the law and represents a major step towards international uniformity of 
commercial law. Moreover, sales law is an especially timely topic in light of the fact that the 
twelve-year project to revise article 2 of the DCC is likely to continue for at least one more 
year. 
33. For a discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis, see infra notes 120-129 and 
accompanying text. 
34. It is not suggested here that this feature of the common-law system is always a 
bad thing. To the contrary, by promoting stability, a historically oriented system of decision 
making protects from abrupt defeat expectations invited by existing commercial 
arrangements. The point is that we pay a price for that stability. When so employed, it slows 
or halts the prudent reformulation of doctrine. 
1999] INERTIA OF HABIT 503 
Finally, Part III suggests that by creating a new legal enviromnent 
for decision making, the CISG may mediate habits of thought and 
profoundly affect the course of domestic law. This Part looks at 
several provisions of the CISG and speculates which are most likely to 
influence the future shape of commercial law. 
I. THE CASE AGAINST THE CISG AS A MODEL FOR LEGISLATIVE 
REFORM 
The CISG represents the culmination of more than two 
generations of international negotiation and received unanimous 
approval by delegations representing sixty-two national legal systems 
at a diplomatic conference convened by the United Nations General 
Assembly in Vienna in 1980.35 Since its adoption, the CISG has been 
ratified (or acceded to) by a total of fifty-seven countries, including the 
three NAFTA trading partners.36 The CISG contains a comprehensive 
set of rules governing the formation, performance, and remedies for 
breach of contracts within its jurisdictional scope. Unless otherwise 
agreed, the CISG applies to "contracts of sale of goods between parties 
whose places of business are in different States ... when the States are 
Contracting States."37 Since the CISG has the preemptive force of 
federal law, it will preempt article 2 when applicable, but otherwise 
article 2 will continue to operate unfettered by the operative principles 
and rules that apply to actions brought under the Convention. Thus, 
buyers and sellers in the United States are faced with two uniform 
35. Efforts to draft a generally acceptable uniform law on international sales had been 
under way for over 50 years. UNIDROIT began the process in 1930 when it undertook to 
draft a uniform law on international sales. Draft laws were considered at diplomatic 
conferences held at the Hague in 1951 and 1964. See M.J. Bonell, Introduction to the 
Convention, in CoMMENTARY ON TIIB INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES 
CoNVENTION 3-7 (M.J. Bonell ed., 1987). These conferences produced two conventions, the 
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Law on the Formation of 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. See id. at 4. These two conventions were 
largely unsuccessful and what followed was a 1978 convention held by UNCITRAL and the 
1980 convention in Vienna For a good historical introduction to the CISG, see Franco 
Ferrari, Unifonn Interpretation of the 1980 Unifonn Sales Law, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
183, 189-95 (1994). 
36. The United Nations maintains a website for up-to-date information on the current 
state of ratifications. See United Nations Treaty Series (visited Nov. 14, 1999) 
<http://www.un.org/Deptslfreaty/collectionlseries/search.htrn>. 
37. CISG, supra note 18, art l(l)(a). The CISG also applies ''when the rules of 
private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State." Id. art 
l(l)(b). Because the United States did not adopt article l(l)(b) (as allowed under article 95), 
the CISG will not apply to American sales contracts when international private law leads to 
the application of a contracting country's own law. 
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legal texts, one for domestic and the other for international contracts 
for the sale of goods. 
It is tempting to say that the CISG is the international equivalent 
of UCC article 2. Yet, despite some similarities, the CISG does not 
necessarily resemble current article 2 in either scope or substance.38 
Roughly, the question is to what extent the CISG should serve as a 
model for revising article 2. There are certainly reasons to look 
beyond uniformity among the states or among nations and strive for 
uniformity between domestic and international law.39 fu a discussion 
of this issue, Professor Richard E. Speidel, the former Reporter for the 
article 2 drafting committee, observed that in today's world of 
centralized and interdependent markets "a dualism between domestic 
and international sales law seems arbitrary, if not quaint and archaic.•'4° 
He offers the following hypothetical: 
Suppose a Canadian seller, whose sole place of business is in Canada, 
manufactures goods for export to the United States and to Mexico. The 
product is advertised in both countries. The goods are sold and shipped 
to a distributor in New York whose sole place of business is in the 
United States and who then resells to buyers in either Mexico or the 
United States. Suppose, :finther, that a resale buyer claims that the 
goods do not conform to its expectations of quality and that commercial 
loss has resulted. There is no damage to property or injury to person.41 
Consideration of the possible lawsuits and the likelihood that the 
applicable substantive law will not be the same forces the conclusion 
38. For example, in terms of scope, the CISG expressly excludes from its coverage 
consumer sales (unless the seller neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were 
purchased for consumer use) and also excludes sales of ships, aircraft, and electricity. See id. 
art. 2. The Code has no such exclusions. In terms of substance, such doctrines as 
"Nachfrist," see infra note 302 and accompanying text, and ''Price Reduction," see CISG, 
supra note 18, art. 50, are foreign to the Code. 
39. See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 29, at 170. Professor Speidel posits: 
Although CISG and Article 2 operate in separate spheres, the transactions 
governed do not observe the sometimes arbitrary jurisdictional lines between 
domestic and international law. For example, uniformity would eliminate 
uncertainty and surprise over the scope of state (UCC) and federal (CISG) sales 
law and avoid disruptions in transactions that originate as domestic sales and 
conclude, through export, as international sales. This is particularly true where 
disputes over the quality of the goods are directly involved. Since this import-
export transaction pattern is a reality in international sales, a sharp line between 
domestic and international sales law seems contrived. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
40. Id. at 171. 
41. Id. at 178-79 (footnote omitted). The reason for the commercial loss limitation is 
that the CISG does not address that aspect of products liability that pertains to death or 
personal injury. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 5. Damage caused by the goods to other 
property is, however, within the scope of the Convention. See id. arts. 1-6. 
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that vertical uniformity, at least in this context, is highly desirable. If 
the claimant is the New York distributor who sues the Canadian seller, 
the CISG applies.42 Suppose that a Mexican resale buyer sues the 
New York distributor and the Canadian seller. The resale buyer has no 
claim under the CISG against the Canadian seller,43 but does have a 
CISG claim against the New York distributor.44 Finally, assume the 
claimant is a United States resale buyer who sues both the New York 
distributor and the Canadian seller. In this case, the UCC governs the 
suit between the two United States parties, and private international 
law rules will dictate what law (UCC or Canadian law) will be used to 
resolve the dispute with the Canadian seller.45 
If all of this seems confusing, it is. Far from simply being an 
interesting theoretical exercise, the choice between the CISG and the 
UCC may be outcome-determinative.46 The result is pervasive 
uncertainty in the contracting process, and the market effect of 
uncertainty is inefficiency. For example, the Canadian seller in the 
foregoing hypothetical simply does not know in advance what law will 
govern if the goods tum out to be defective. Lacking necessary 
information, it cannot be certain what its potential liability would be. 
This makes it difficult to shape each transaction so that the burdens 
and risks are allocated in an acceptable manner. Moreover, the fact 
that the buyer's expectation of quality derived from the seller's express 
or implied representations has greater protection under article 2 than 
under the CISG may have disastrous consequences for an intermediate 
seller in the position of the New York distributor. Assuming that it is 
liable to a United States buyer for breach of warranty, it may be 
42. See CISG, supra note 18, art. l(l)(a). 
43. The CISG does not speak directly to the issue of privity of contract. It does, 
however, provide that the Convention "governs only the formation of the contract of sale and 
the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract." Id. art. 4. 
Moreover, article 35(1) limits quality disputes to what the contract requires. This language 
strongly suggests that the CISG applies only to the two-person sale between commercial 
parties. Assuming that a court would be unwilling to read the terms "seller," "buyer," and 
"contract'' broadly so as to bring these remote sale cases within the scope of the Convention, 
is the Mexican buyer without a remedy against the Canadian seller? Presumably, the 
outcome depends on the applicability of the domestic sales law made relevant by choice of 
law rules. If the UCC were applicable, the seller's liability would ultimately depend on 
whether the resale buyer is able to recover on a direct warranty theory (recall that the goods 
were advertised in Mexico) under UCC section 2-313 or as a third-party beneficiary under 
UCC section 2-318. 
44. See id. art. l(l)(a). 
45. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
46. See Speidel, supra note 29, at 181-86. 
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surprised to learn that it is unable to pass that liability upstream to its 
seller.47 
For legal scholars concerned about reducing transaction costs for 
transnational trade and for the article 2 drafting committee, the 
question is where to go from here. Answers diverge shaiply. All 
acknowledge, to some extent, the importance of harmonizing domestic 
and international laws. Some, however, argue that the CISG is an 
inappropriate model for revised article 2,48 while others contend that, 
although it is unlikely that the committee would adopt the CISG with 
little or no change, there should be some strategy for coordination that 
would identify those CISG provisions that should be incorporated into 
the Code.49 Notwithstanding the perceived benefits of harmonization, 
the drafting committee has largely ignored the CISG.50 As Professor 
Speidel states, "[T]he process of harmonization to date has been ad 
hoc and reflects highly selective borrowing."51 
Now consider some of the factors that support the drafting 
committee's position not to fully embrace the CISG and whether these 
same factors suggest that courts, too, should be immune from the 
adoption of international perspectives or approaches. Each of these 
factors is multifaceted and cannot be fully explored here. The 
47. For example, the CISG and article 2 seemingly agree on the treatment of the so-
called implied warranties. Without saying so, the standards of quality in article 35(2) of the 
CISG closely track the UCC's implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to -315 (1998). The track is not completely parallel, 
however, because under article 2 goods that are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such 
goods are used" may still not ''pass without objection in the trade under the contract 
description." Id. § 2-314(2). Thus, when the implied warranty is made, the scope of 
merchantability protection is somewhat higher under article 2 than under the CISG. It is 
therefore possible for the New York distributor to breach this warranty when it sells in a 
Code-governed transaction but have no claim against its seller in a CISG-govemed 
transaction. 
48. See, e.g., Gabriel, supra note 29, at2001-13; Speidel, supra note 29, at 171-78. 
49. See Winship, supra note 27, at 50. Winship suggests that the committee "might 
identify (I) issues so important that differences between the two laws should be justified; 
(2) issues so relatively unimportant that there is no reason for differences even in language; 
and (3) devices to ensure that sellers and buyers know how the two laws complement each 
other." Id. at48. 
50. It is worth recalling that one of the reasons given by the Permanent Editorial 
Board Study Committee for revising article 2 was the existence of "competing and better 
solutions to sales problems" in the CISG. PEB Study Group: Uniform Commercial Code, 
Article 2 Executive Summary, in 46 Bus. LAW. 1869, 1871 (1991). It is also worth noting 
that Finland and Sweden revised their domestic sales laws in light of the Convention. See 
Winship, supra note 27, at 46 n.13. 
51. Speidel, supra note 29, at 169. For example, the drafting committee had the 
CISG in mind when it decided to delete the definitions of delivery terms in Part 3 of the 
current Code, see U.C.C. § 2-319 (Interim Draft Nov. 1999), and expanded the seller's right 
to "cure" a nonconforming tender, see id. § 2-508. 
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discussion is confined to those aspects on which commentators 
generally agree. 
A. Differences in Background Law 
One argument against the wholesale adoption of the CISG is that 
there is no established fit between it and the well-established principles 
of the common law of contracts. si Article 2, in contrast, was drafted as 
part of a comprehensive commercial law system consisting not only of 
the various sections within an article and the several articles but also of 
domestic common law and statutes external to the Code.s3 Seen this 
way, commercial law has, or should have, certain characteristics of 
orderliness, systematic and interrelated rules, and a precise, consistent 
terminology that gives it a rational structure. It is for this reason that 
the drafters of the Code were comfortable leaving gaps in article 2 to 
be filled by a considerable body of case law.s4 The chief concern is 
that because the CISG was not drafted with any particular legal system 
in mind, there will be no reliable source of gap fillers.ss Thus, the 
advantages of clarity and certainty, superior accessibility, and the 
52. See Gabriel, supra note 29, at 2003-04; Speidel, supra note 29, at 171-72. 
Actually, the argument is broader. In addition to maintaining a fit between article 2 and the 
common law, commentators have pointed out that article 2 is a component part of a 
commercial code in which there is a consistency of definitions and policies. See Gabriel, 
supra note 29, at 2004-05; Speidel, supra note 29, at 172. 
53. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1998). The fact that each article of the Code is part of a 
much larger system means that today's drafters must view their task (at least in part) as 
making sure that the topics dealt with in the Code fit together in a logical way. This requires 
not only that the sections in each article be compatJ.'ble, but additionally, that there be a 
systematic tying together of the several articles. Moreover, the ability to recommend 
particular decisions will depend on the drafting committee's insight into the location of the 
doctrine in question within the entire commercial world order. I have argued that several 
decisions of the drafting committee are inexplicable in terms of policy and fail to 
accommodate essential policies expressed elsewhere in the Code and, in some cases, in the 
law outside of the Code. See Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commercial Codification as 
Negotiation, 32 U.C. DAVISL. REv. 17, 28-44 (1998). 
54. Section 1-103 of the Code sanctions the use of non-Code principles of law and 
equity. It provides, ''Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles 
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, 
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, 
or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103. 
However, determining when the Code has displaced a particular non-Code rule is no easy 
matter. See David Frisch, Buyers Remedies and Warranty Disclaimers: 11ze Cose for 
Mistake and the Jndeterminancy of U.C.C. Section 1-103, 43 ARK. L. REv. 291, 333-43 
(1990). 
55. The CISG provides that gaps in coverage are to be filled first by internal analogy 
when the CISG contains an applicable general principle and, in the absence of a guiding 
principle, by reference to the rules of private international law. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 
7(2). 
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economy of the common law as a source of fallback principles are 
lost. 
AE an illustration of the mesh between article 2 and non-Code 
law, 56 consider the simple contract formation issue of when a mailed 
acceptance takes effect. On this point the Code is silent-but not the 
common law. Every first-year law student learns that a mailed 
acceptance is effective to make a contract when and where mailed, i.e., 
the "mailbox" rule.57 By virtue of UCC section 1-103, this rule 
supplements the Code and it was, therefore, unnecessary for the 
drafters of article 2 to include such a provision. They knew what they 
were getting when they chose this course. But suppose that a context 
develops in which there are conflicting common law rules stated in 
different opinions. For example, what if there ceased to be a single, 
invariant, and comprehensive statement of the mailbox rule? In such a 
case, legislative silence may no longer be the appropriate response. 
This ambiguity is exactly what has happened in the area of 
electronic contracting. Reacting to case law58 and the perception that 
electronic communication is more akin to a face-to-face conversation 
56. From the inception of the article 2 drafting project, attention has been paid to the 
common law. In 1987, Professors Speidel and Mooney submitted an influential 
memorandum to the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. See 
Richard E. Speidel & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Proposal for a Preliminary Study on a Possible 
Project for the Revision of Article 2, UCC (1987) in THE EMERGING NEW UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 409 (1989). The memorandum's stated purposes were ''to identify 
various areas of inquiry for the proposed Preliminary Study on the Revision ofU.C.C. Article 
2," and to "provide a useful agenda for the work of an Article 2 study group." Id. This 
memorandum was probably instrumental in the Permanent Editorial Board's decision to 
conduct a formal study. Referring to the potential tension between the general theory of 
contract in the Second Restatement of Contracts and article 2, the authors raised the 
possibility that some concepts now found in both may be dropped without consequence from 
article 2. See id. at 410 & n.2. They used as examples the duty of good faith and the doctrine 
ofunconscionability. See id. at 410 n.2; see also U.C.C. § 1-203 (1998) (duty of good faith); 
id. § 2-302 (unconscionability); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (duty 
of good faith); id. § 208 (unconscionability). The unstated assumption is that these concepts 
will remain part of a larger body of commercial law, concurrently available to courts as a 
source oflaw for deciding cases under the Code. 
57. This rule originated in the venerable case of Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng. Rep. 
250 (K.B. 1818). For a critique of this rule, see Ian R. Macneil, Time of Acceptance: Too 
Many Problems for a Single Rule, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 947 (1964). See also REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981) ("Unless the offer provides otherwise, ... an 
acceptance made in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer is operative and completes 
the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, without 
regard to whether it ever reaches the offeror."). 
58. See, e.g., Dickey v. Hurd, 33 F.2d 415, 418 (lst Cir. 1929) (holding that the place 
where telegraphed acceptance was received was the place where the contract was formed). 
Section 64 of the Second Restatement of Contracts treats acceptance by any medium of 
instantaneous two-way communication the same as if the parties were in the presence of one 
another. 
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than it is to paper-based communication, .the article 2 drafting 
committee has decided to scrap the mailbox rule in favor of a time-of-
receipt rule when an "offer'' evokes an electronic message in response 
(the "acceptance").59 In short, article 2 cannot be isolated from the 
legal system in which it will operate, and to draft wisely, that system 
must be understood and taken into account. 
The argument that the CISG was not drafted within a context of 
established principles of domestic law is a serious warning to the 
article 2 drafting committee, yet it is by no means a conclusive 
argument against selective borrowing by that committee or by those 
courts that view the judiciary as an instrument of legal change. To 
conclude otherwise is essentially to take the position against any and 
all legal change. ''New" law, whether effectuated by legislation or by 
judges, will inevitably alter the corresponding background law. 
Historically, this has never prevented drafting committees from 
revising the Code or judges from adopting new rules to implement 
new policies or inventing new implements for old policies. 
B. Differences in Scope 
Moreover, some argue the CISG is not appropriate in toto as a 
model for revising article 2 because the scope of each instrument is 
different. 60 To be sure, the Convention does not track the Code in 
every respect. In the first place, the CISG expressly excludes from its 
coverage consumer sales and sales of ships, aircraft, and electricity. 61 
The scope of the Code is not so limited. A further limitation upon the 
scope of the CISG is that, although it governs the formation of the 
sales contract and the rights and obligations of the buyer and the seller, 
it excludes certain questions relating to ''the validity of the contract or 
of any of its provisions or of any usage."62 In contrast, article 2 
contains rules of validity, 63 including what is perhaps the most 
powerful and far-reaching of all validity doctrines, the doctrine of 
59. See U.C.C. § 2-204(e)(3)(A) (Interim Draft Nov. 1999). 
60. See, e.g., Gabriel, supra note 29, at 2005-08; Speidel, supra note 29, at 173-74. 
61. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 2. The consumer sales exception does not apply if 
the seller "at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to 
have known that the goods were bought for any such use." Id. 
62. Id. art. 4(a). Capacity to contract, agency, fraud, duress, and coercion are among 
the supplementary domestic doctrines that can bear on validity. See generally Helen 
Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. lNT'L L. l (1993 ). 
63. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1998) ("A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated 
damages is void as a penalty."); id. § 2-725(1) ("By the original agreement the parties may 
reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it."). 
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unconscionability.64 Finally, the scope of the CISG differs from the 
Code in three other important respects: · first, the CISG is not 
concerned with the effect of the contract on the property in the goods 
sold;65 second, it does not apply to claims for death or personal injury 
caused by the goods;66 and third, it is silent on the rights of third 
persons who are not parties to the contract.67 
The principle problem with this argument as a basis for rejecting 
the CISG is that the issue of scope is complex and sometimes highly 
controversial. An example of this is the brief history of the drafting 
committee's involvement with computer software and other related 
intangibles. In November 1992, the committee was instructed by the 
NCCUSL to prepare a review of article 2 focusing on sections that 
may require revision if software contracts are included in article 2. 68 
To carry out this new charge, the committee adopted what became 
!mown as the ''hub and spoke" approach. 69 The idea was that the 
scope of revised article 2 would be broadened to cover three 
transactions involving the transfer of interests in personal property: 
the sale of goods, the lease of goods, and the transfer of intangibles 
such as data, technology, and other intellectual property.70 The 
objective of this approach was to state principles common to all in the 
''hub" and to state principles unique to each in the "spoke."71 In 1995, 
however, the NCCUSL formed a separate article 2B committee to deal 
with software and licenses of information and directed the article 2 
committee to return to its original job of drafting a new sales article. 72 
64. See id. § 2-302. 
65. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 4(b). Article 2, on the other hand, includes not just 
a statement of the good faith purchase doctrine, see U.C.C. § 2-403 (1998), but also 
statements that define the remedial rights on the claims of third persons. See, e.g., id. § 2-502 
(buyer's right to goods on seller's insolvency); id. § 2-402 (rights of seller's creditors against 
sold goods). 
66. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 5. In a proper case, article 2 permits recovery for 
all types ofinjury. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1998) ("Consequential damages resulting from the 
seller's breach include ... injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach 
of warranty.''). 
67. Article 2 permits certain claims to be brought by parties not in privity who are 
affected by the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (1998). 
68. See Raymond T. Nimmer et al., License Contracts Under Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal, 19 RUTGERS CoMPUTER & TEcH. L.J. 281, 290 
(1993). 
69. See id. at318-22. 
70. See id. at 319-28. 
71. See id. at319-20. 
72. See U.C.C. art. 2B preface (Tentative Draft Apr. 28, 1998). 
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This decision was made, not because the hub and spoke approach was 
illogical, but because it was controversial.73 
Another example is the controversy of whether article 2 should 
apply to products liability cases involving personal injury or injury to 
property other than the goods sold. The current impetus for this debate 
is the ALI's recent adoption of the Third Restatement of Torts: 
Products Liability, 74 which addresses the liability of commercial 
manufacturers and sellers for hann caused by their defective 
products.75 The Third Restatement is the Institute's effort to restate 
products liability law more than a quarter century after section 402A 
was adopted as part of the Second Restatement of Torts. It is not 
smprising that the Institute would seek to jealously guard the turf 
carved out by the new Restatement and argue for a diminished role for 
the Code in this important area. Specifically, there is disagreement 
over whether the tests for merchantability and defectiveness should be 
the same when personal injuries or damage to property are involved. 
The article 2 committee's eventual response will be to describe the 
merchantability/defect relationship in the official comments rather than 
in the black-letter Code law, an apparent attempt to legislate by 
comment: 
When recovezy is sought for injury to person or property, whether 
goods are merchantable is to be determined by applicable state products 
liability law. 
When, however, a claim for injury to person or property is based on 
an implied warranty of fitness under Section 2-405 or an express 
warranty under Sections 2-403 or 2-408, this Article determines 
whether an implied warranty of fitness or an express warranty was 
made and breached, as well as what damages are recoverable under 
Section 2-806.76 
In these circumstances, it is odd to suggest that the CISG cannot 
substitute for article 2 merely because the scope of each is different. 
To be sure, the committee has never assumed that the scope of revised 
73. See id. The fate of the hub and spoke project is reminiscent of what happened to 
the so-called ''New Payments Code." The goal of that project was to combine UCC articles 3 
and 4 and other areas of commercial law dealing with payments into one unified treatment 
within the Code. Opposition was so strong that after years of work the project was dropped. 
See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a La~er, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the 
Process of Revising UCCArticles 3 and 4, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REY. 743, 745-46 (1993). 
74. The ALI finally adopted the Restatement on May 20, 1997. 
75. See generally Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability-The American Law Institutes Process of Democracy and Deliberation, 26 
HOFSfRA L. REY. 743 (1998) (describing the transition from the Second to the Third 
Restatement). 
76. U.C.C. § 2-404 cmt 4 (Proposed Final Draft May 1, 1999) (emphasis omitted). 
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article 2 would remain the same as the current version. It is thus 
plausible that, after careful review and deliberation, the committee 
would choose to narrow the scope of article 2 in conformity with the 
CISG even if the consequence of that decision is to produce a Code 
that is radically different from the present one. Moreover, if the 
committee prefers a broader statute, it always has the option of 
choosing the CISG initially and then adding provisions to extend its 
scope where appropriate. Finally, rejection of the CISG has no bearing 
on the less global issue of whether some of its provisions are suitable 
for incorporation into revised article 2 or the common law either in 
substitution of, or in addition to, existing rules. 
One other facet of the scope argument should be mentioned: the 
absence in the CISG of certain provisions with which American 
attorneys have long been familiar. For example, there is no statute of 
:frauds77 or parol evidence rule,78 or requirement of good faith in the 
performance and enforcement of a contract. 79 These gaps in the 
CISG's coverage do not justify a general preference for the historical 
scope of article 2. These rules would require some reconsideration 
even if the drafting committee faced no problems of scope. Those 
who urge rejection of the CISG because these provisions are absent 
must explain why any perceived problem caused by the substantive 
gaps created cannot be handled by selective supplementation. 
77. The CISG provides that "[a] contract of sale need not be concluded in or 
evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to form." CISG, supra 
note 18, art. 11. Article 12, however, permits ·contracting states to make a declaration under 
article 96 to prevent the application of article 11. See id. art. 12. If either party to a contract 
has its place of business in a contracting state that has made such a declaration, then 
applicable domestic law dictates the extent to which an evidentiazy writing is necessazy. See 
id.; id. art. 96. Interestingly, the article 2 drafting committee decided to abolish the statute of 
frauds in 1993, see U.C.C. § 2-201 (Revised Draft Dec. 21, 1993), and reversed that decision 
in 1996, see id. § 2-201 (Revised Draft July 1997). 
78. The language of CISG article 8 that "due consideration is to be given to all 
relevant circumstances of the case" is essentially a rejection of the parol evidence rule. 
CISG, supra note 18, art. 8(3). Unfortunately, not all courts agree with this conclusion. 
Compare MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Cerarnica Nuova D'Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 
1384, 1388-89 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that article 8(3) permits the introduction of parol 
evidence), with Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Bus. Ctr., Inc., 
993 F.2d 1178, 1182-83 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that the parol evidence rule applies to 
CISG cases). 
79. "Good faith" is a basic principle running throughout article 2. See, e.g., U.C.C. 
§§ 1-203, 1-201(19), 2-103(l)(b) (1998). Good faith is relevant to interpretation of the CISG 
only; there is no general obligation that the parties carry out their obligations in good faith. 
See CISG, supra note 18, art. 7(1 ). Notwithstanding the literal language of article 7(1 ), some 
commentators have suggested that it does impose a duty to act in good faith in a CISG-
covered case. See Peter Winship, Commentary on Professor Kastelys Rhetorical Analysis, 8 
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 623, 630-35 (1988). 
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In sum, in deciding whether to adopt the CISG, it is not enough 
to point out the differences in scope between it and the current article 
2. It is also necessary for the drafting committee to have the 
appropriate conception regarding the scope of the new statute. 
Although much more can and should be said about issues of scope, the 
purpose of this subpart is to facilitate a better understanding of the 
options that were available to the drafting committee and to show that 
the choices made should not necessarily affect the influence the CISG 
might have with courts. 
C Differences in Substance 
From the very beginning, it was obvious to everyone involved in 
the drafting of the CISG that successful delocalization of commercial 
law depended upon a spirit of compromise. This is quite 
understandable. Those participating in the project represented a 
variety of legal traditions, cultures, and economic systems. If the 
participants had insisted on retaining domestic legal concepts, it is 
clear that nothing would have been accomplished. 80 
Consider the question of interest. Article 78 states that if a party 
fails to pay the price or any other "sum that is in arrears," the other 
party is entitled to interest on it.81 Notice that nothing is said about the 
formula to calculate the rate of interest. This is because the provisions 
on interest were the subject of great controversy and differences of 
opinion; hence, it was difficult to agree on a solution that would satisfy 
the majority. First, different national legal systems treat the 
entitlement to interest differently, and some even forbid the charging 
of interest entirely.82 A further difficulty arose from the fact that any 
reference to an external standard, such as the official discount rate or 
the prime rate, would not work because these rates do not exist in 
80. See Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 265, 268 (1984) ("The 
Convention of necessity is a compromise between the Jong held doctrinal tenets of the 
common-Jaw system and the civil-Jaw systems; between individualistic, captalistic [sic] 
systems and collectivistic, socialistic systems; between developed, industrial societies and 
underdeveloped societies seeking a new international economic order."). 
81. CISG, supra note 18, art. 78. 
82. See Jelena Vilus, Provisions Common to the Obligations of the Seller and the 
Buyer, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF Gooos: DUBROVNIK LECTURES 239, 252 (Petar Sar~evic 
& Paul Volken eds., 1986). For example, the Muslim countries objected to an interest rate 
provision because it would be contrary to Islamic Jaw. See id. Curiously, Muslim countries 
do permit the buyer to recover interest in cases where the seller is bound to return the price. 
Consequently, they did not object to article 84(1) which provides that "[i]f the seller is bound 
to refund the price, he must also pay interest on it, from the date on which the price was 
paid." CISG, supra note 18, art. 84(1). 
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some countries. 83 Finally, there was disagreement as to whether the 
rate, however defined, should be one applicable in the creditor's 
country or in the buyer's.84 Legislative silence was, therefore, chosen 
as the perfect compromise. The result is that article 78 is "a provision 
based, as it were, on the highest common factor."85 
Given such a background, it should not be surprising to discover 
that the cISG does not follow the style or arrangement of article 2. 
Many of the articles in the CISG are drafted differently, and many new 
terms are employed. The approach of the CISG to the buyer's rights 
on an improper delivery is a good example. Under the Code, if the 
seller's tender fails in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer 
may either accept or reject the goods.86 Once the goods have been 
accepted, the buyer can avoid an action for the price only if permitted 
to revoke her acceptance.87 If the buyer has either rightfully rejected 
or justifiably revoked acceptance, she may then cancel the contract. 88 
A key distinction between the Code and the CISG is that the latter 
makes "avoidance" the remedial linchpin of the buyer's right to 
tenninate the contractual relationship of the parties. 89 The remedy of 
avoidance will, in tum, depend on whether the seller has committed a 
":fundamental breach.''9° If the seller has committed a :fundamental 
breach, the buyer can avoid the contract. Subject to one exception, if 
the seller has not committed a :fundamental breach, the buyer cannot 
avoid the contract.91 As Professor Harry Fletchner concisely 
83. See B. Nicholas, Article 78, in CoMMENTARYONTIIEINTERNATIONALSALESLAW: 
THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CoNVENTION, supra note 35, at 568, 569-70. 
84. Seeid. 
85. U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 11th plen. 
mtg. at 226, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1981). During the course of the Conference's 
preparations, article 78 was referred to as-article "73 bis." See id. at 486. 
86. This is known as the Code's "perfect tender rule." See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1998). 
The perfect tender rule is, however, limited to single-delivery contracts. If the contract is an 
installment contract, see id. § 2-612(1), the buyer may reject a delivery only "if the non-
conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured." Id § 2-
612(2). 
87. See id. §§ 2-607 to -608. Unlike the remedy of rejection, revocation of 
acceptance is permitted only if the nonconformity causes substantial impairment of value. 
See id. § 2-608(1). Both rightful rejection and justifiable revocation relieve the buyer of the 
responsibility to pay for the goods and entitle the buyer to market/contract price or cover 
damages. See id.§§ 2-711 to-713. 
88. See id.§ 2-711(1). The buyer's rightto cancel is located in section 2-703(f). 
89. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 49. 
90. See id. art. 49(1)(a). A breach "is fundamental ifit results in such detriment to 
the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the 
contract," provided this result is foreseeable. Id. art. 25. 
91. There is one situation apart from fundamental breach that allows a buyer to avoid 
the contract Um;ler article 49, the buyer can avoid the contract if, in the case of nondelivery, 
the seller does not or will not deliver the goods within the additional time fixed by the buyer 
1999] INERTIA OF HABIT 515 
explaine4 ''For those schooled in Article 2 of the U.C.C., the 
Convention's use of avoidance/nonavoidance rather than 
acceptance/nonacceptance significantly changes the analysis of 
remedies. In some situations, the Convention's approach produces 
notably different results.''92 For instance, suppose that the seller 
tenders goods with minor defects. The article 2 buyer can reject 
(avoid) and recover damages to compensate for the lost favorable 
exchange.93 Moreover, if the exchange turns out to be a bad bargain, 
the perfect tender rule provides the buyer with an easy means of 
escape.94 Because the CISG contains a single standard of :fundamental 
breach applicable in all circumstances, avoidance (rejection) is not a 
remedial option.95 Under the CISG, therefore, the exchange will go 
forward with damages or other remedies to compensate for the defects. 
There are several other notable differences in substance between 
the CISG and article 2. For example, the contract formation scheme is 
one aspect of the CISG in which a lawyer trained in the common law 
and the Code is likely to find some surprises. One striking feature of 
the Convention's formation rules is that an acceptance of an offer is 
effective when it reaches the offeror and not when mailed as provided 
by the common-law ''mailbox rule.''96 However, one important effect 
of the mailbox rule is retained: an offeror may not revoke an offer 
once the offeree has dispatched her acceptance.97 
A more appreciable disparity is that the CISG's provisions 
defining acceptance seem to codify the common-law ''mirror-image" 
rule.98 If the purported acceptance contains any additions, limitations, 
or other modifications of an offer, article 19(1) labels it as a rejection 
and a counteroffer.99 Article 19(2) apparently softens this rule 
somewhat by providing that if the additional or different terms do not 
in a Nachfrist notice under article 47. See id. arts. 47, 49. For discussion of the Nachfrist 
procedure, see infra note 286 and text accompanying notes 295-302. 
92. Harry M. Flechtner, Remedies Under the New International Sales Convention: 
ThePerspectivefromArticle2 of the U.C.C., 8 J.L. & CoM. 53, 57 (1988). 
93. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1998). This example assumes a single-delivery contract 
For a discussion of installment contracts, see supra note 86. 
94. See U.C.C. § 2-601. This statement embodies two assumptions. The first is that 
the seller cannot or chooses not to cure the breach under section 2-508. The second 
assumption is that the buyer is not acting in bad faith under section 1-203 or section 2-
103(l)(b). 
95. See CISG, supra note 18, arts. 25, 49. 
96. See id. art 18(2). For a discussion of the ''mailbox rule," see supra note 57 and 
accompanying text 
97. See CISG, supra note 18, art 16(1 ). 
98. See id. art 19. For a further discussion of this rule, see infra notes 146-161 and 
accompanying text 
99. See CISG, supra note 18, art 19. 
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"materially altet''.the terms of the offer, a contract is formed unless the 
offeror objects to the discrepancy.100 However, when one considers the 
breadth of the Convention's definition of terms that materially alter an 
offer, it is obviohs that the CISG has adopted the mirror-image rule 
hook, line, and sinker. 
Section 2-207 of the Code, on the other hand, approaches the 
matter from an entirely different direction.101 Section 2-207(1) 
radically departs from the mirror-image rule by providing that an 
expression of acceptance containing additional or different terms 
operates as an acceptance unless the acceptance is expressly made 
conditional on the offeror's assent to the additional terms.102 This 
difference in approach is most relevant in transactions involving what 
has become known as the ''battle of the forms."103 
In those situations where the parties have exchanged writings 
containing varying terms, short of performance, there will be fewer 
binding contracts under the CISG than under the Code. Moreover, the 
Convention and the Code will probably lead to different results in the 
event that the parties exchange conflicting forms and subsequently 
perform. Assuming that the offeree's reply contains terms that are 
materially different from those contained in the offer, two outcomes 
are possible under the Code: (1) If the reply constitutes the requisite 
"definite and seasonable expression of acceptance," a contract is 
formed on the offeror's terms;104 or (2) If the reply is not an 
acceptance, the contract formed by performance will include only 
those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with 
any necessary Code gap fillers. 105 In disputes governed by the CISG, 
the resulting contract will always be on the terms of the party who 
100. Seeid. 
101. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (1998). 
102. See id. Section 2-207(2) resolves the issue of which provisions are part of the 
final contract. 
103. The official comments to UCC section 2-207 give a classic description of the 
battle of the forms phenomenon: 
A frequent example ... is the exchange of printed purchase order and acceptance 
(sometimes called "acknowledgment") forms. Because the forms are oriented to 
the thinking of the respective drafting parties, the terms contained in them often do 
not correspond. Often the seller's form contains terms different from or additional 
to those set forth in the buyer's form. Nevertheless, the parties proceed with the 
transaction. 
Id. § 2-207 cmt. I. If the parties do not proceed with the transaction because one party 
repudiates, the issue becomes whether the exchange of forms created a contract. 
104. Id. § 2-207(1). 
105. See id. § 2-207(3); see also id. §§ 2-305 to -311 (identifying the gap fillers to be 
used unless the parties agree otherwise). 
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sends the last counteroffer. 106 Although the identity of that party will 
naturally depend on the circumstances, most often it will be the seller 
who aclmowledges the buyer's purchase order before shipping the 
goods. Thus, under the CISG, because acceptance of the goods by the 
buyer is an acceptance of the seller's counteroffer, the buyer is bound 
by the provisions in the aclmowledgment.107 In short, the CISG 
resurrects the "last shof' outcome that article 2 rejects. 
There are many other aspects of the CISG that are different from 
the Code. These differences take many forms, but most spring from a 
tendency to fashion compromises among legal traditions and 
economic regions.108 This tendency is not, by itself, a problem. 
Compromise can be considered a problem only against some 
normative background that distinguishes good commercial law from 
bad commercial law. Those who have taken the position that article 2 
should not be modeled after the CISG because the latter is 
substantively different must therefore distinguish objectionable from 
unobjectionable differences. This they have not done. There is, 
however, at least one legitimate reason for resisting wholesale 
adoption of an instrument that draws heavily on diverse traditions and 
backgrounds. If the CISG were suddenly to replace the Code, it would 
unsettle understandings and case law that have grown up around the 
present statutory structure and language. To the extent that continuity 
with the past is normatively compelling, the rejection of the CISG as 
the ''new'' article 2 is normatively warranted as well. The more 
difficult questions are whether courts should or will take a constructive 
role in the implementation of particular CISG innovations and what 
effect, if any, the CISG is likely to have on the future application of the 
Code. First, however, we must appreciate the usefulness of the 
concept of habit to explain why particular cases are decided in a 
certain way. As the next Part suggests, habit possesses strong 
motivational properties likely to affect judicial att:itudes. 
II. THE RELEVANCE OF HABIT IN SHAPING JUDICIAL OUTCOMES 
The traditional legal model of judicial decision making posits that 
the law and the dispute determine outcomes. In this model, judges are 
viewed as neutral arbiters who remain unfettered by societal biases 
106. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 19. 
107. The seller will argue that by accepting the goods, the buyer engaged in "conduct 
... indicating assent to [the] offer." Id. art. 18(1 ). 
108. See Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAW. 443, 452-80 
(1989). 
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and can focus on case facts, precedent, and legislative intent when 
deciding cases.109 In contrast, the dominant tendency of social 
scientists is to emphasize that the law holds little sway in shaping 
outcomes.110 The underlying premise of this extralegal model is that 
judges resolve disputes based on external factors, such as the judges' 
role orientations, attitudes, partisanship, and parochial values.111 Yet 
these theoretical approaches are insufficient as complete explanations 
for judicial decision making. While both models of behavior have 
many advantages and lead to insights that the other ignores, neither 
one provides a complete understanding of the factors that influence 
judges. Perhaps most important, each model assumes that only legal 
or extralegal cues matter. What ·is needed, therefore, is a more 
109. See, e.g., J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURrS OF APPEALS IN TIIE FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTII, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CiRCtnTS 
162 (1981) ("Only one [circuit] judge [swveyed] unqualifiedly endorsed the view thatjudges 
should merely interpret the law, a traditional conception of judicial duty still prominent on 
several state supreme courts and trial courts."); C.I<. ROWLAND & ROBEIIT A. CARP, POLITICS 
AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURrS 3 (1996) ("In many cases dispute resolution ..• 
approximates the traditional, mechanical model of judicial norm enforcement-that is, the 
trial judge 'finds' the law, 'fits' the law to the facts, and rules in favor of the litigant whose 
facts fit the law.''). For a judicial expression of this view, see United States v. Butler, 297 
U.S. 1 (1936), in which the United States Supreme Court stated: 
It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to overrule or control the action 
of the people's representatives. This is a misconception. . . . When an act of 
Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the 
constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty,-
to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is 
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. 
Id. at62. 
110. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME CoURr AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 1 (1993) ("As we demonstrate, the legal model serves only to cloak-
to conceal-the motivations that cause the justices to decide as they do.''). 
111. See, e.g., DAVID W. ROIIDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURr DECISION 
MAKING 72 (1976) ("[A]ll three factors-goals, rules, and situations-may affect decisions 
and outcomes.''); ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 109, at vii ("[P]olitical scientists rejected the 
assumptions of mechanical, precedent-bound jurisprudence in favor of the heretical notion 
that justices' decisions could be characterized as 'votes,' and that these votes were motivated 
by their personal beliefs and policy preferences.''); James L. Gibson, Judges' Role 
Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REY. 911, 
911 (1978) ("[T]here appears to be a consensus that attitudes and role orientations are 
important predictors of behavior ... .''); Michael W. Giles & Thomas G. Walker, Judicial 
Policy-Making and Southern School Segregation, 37 J. POL. 917, 919 (1975) (''The racial 
attitudes developed by these judges through a lifetime cannot be expected to disappear with 
the acquisition of judicial robes.''); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Discriminant Function and a 
Theoretical Context for Its Use in Estimating the Votes of Judges, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL 
REsEARcH 335, 342 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969) ("[A] judge, in 
selecting a response to a particular situation, must have some knowledge of his preferences, 
the alternative actions open to him, and the relationship or effect of these actions on his 
preferences.''). 
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dynamic model that addresses both types of cues.112 This Part does not 
purport to advance such a fully integrated attitude-behavior model, nor 
does it attempt to identify all the variables playing a role in the 
decision process. Other scholars are better equipped to carzy out such 
a mission. Instead, the goal is to develop a partial explanation of 
judicial behavior that links case outcomes to habit and then to look for 
corroborating evidence of this explanation in several reported cases. 
In general, early behavioral research on judicial decision making 
was uniconceptual in its approach. The predominant model focused 
almost exclusively on attitude as the key predictor of behavior.113 As 
originally stated, this rests on the assumption that judges, like most 
other decision makers in political institutions, render their decisions 
based upon their personal attitudes and values.114 Specifically, judges' 
attitudes dictate the substantive objectives they hope to achieve 
through their decisions. Thus, the notion that behavior is predicated 
solely on external legal stimuli is explicitly rejected. Yet, while 
attitude may be a partial explanation for behavior, there can be little 
doubt that additional factors affect the process. 
We seem to know intuitively that judges do not, and cannot, 
simply do what they want. Without some external restraints, courts 
would lose their moral and political legitimacy. There must be norms 
of behavior that constrain the activities of judges. Several scholars 
have suggested that the relationship between attitudes and behavior is, 
therefore, modified by the concept of role orientation.115 Role 
112. See ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 109, at 131-51; see also Tracey E. George & 
Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. Ser. REY. 323, 
334 (1992) ("[I]he most complete explanation of judicial outcomes should incorporate legal 
and extralegal factors. Seen in this light, the views of neither the classical legal thinkers nor 
the behavioralists are incorrect; but they are incomplete."). 
113. See Gibson, supra note 111, at 912 (''There is little question that the predominant 
paradigm of judicial decision making places judges' attitudes in the center of the process. 
Indeed, it is not an overstatement to assert that attitudinal approaches have become the 
traditional nontraditional mode of judicial analysis."). 
114. See, e.g., Glendon Schubert, Judicial Attitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 
Tenn of the United States Supreme Court, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 100, 134-35 (1963) 
("Mariance in the voting behavior of the justices during the 1961 Term can be adequately 
accounted for by the differences in their attitudes towards the fundamental issues of civil 
liberty and economic liberalism."); Joseph Tanenhaus, The Cumulative Scaling of Judicial 
Decisions, 79 HAR.v. L. REY. 1583, 1583 (1966) ("Malue structure leads to judicial attitudes, 
to predispositions toward deciding given types of cases in particular ways. A judge may, for 
example, be predisposed to support-or to deny-legal claims by labor unions, criminal 
defendants, racial minorities, federal regulatory agencies, or state and local authorities.''). 
115. See Victor Eugene Flango et al., The Concept of Judicial Role: A 
Methodological Note, 19 AM. J. POL. Ser. 277, 280 (1975) ("Preliminary data analysis 
convinced us that judicial discretion was in fact composed of not one but two separate 
dimensions-precedent orientation and public orientation.''); James L. Gibson, The Role 
520 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:495 
orientation has been defined as a "psychological construct which is the 
combination of the [judge's] perception of the role expectations of 
significant others and his or her own norms and expectations of proper 
behavior for a judge."116 When role orientations are combined with 
attitudes, a model of behavior is created that predicts that judges will 
do what they prefer only if they believe that it would be consistent 
with what they are supposed to do.117 
If judges' decisions are a function of their attitudes and role 
orientations, it is fruitful to consider the processes through which these 
attitudes and orientations are acquired. Although one can conceive of 
many sources of influence, 118 the specific effect of law schools on 
judges' values cannot be ignored.119 The impact of a law school 
education on behavior can be easily demonstrated through reference to 
one of the most fundamental aspects of judge-based law-the practice 
of precedent. 
Precedent is best lmown as stare decisis et non quieta movere, 
translated to mean "let the decision stand and do not disturb things 
which have been settled"120 or "stand by the precedents and do not 
disturb the calm."121 It is this system of precedent that is emblematic 
of legal study, described as "the task of training students to discern the 
'holdings' of cases and to determine whether those precedent cases 
have been followed, appropriately distinguished, or overruled in 
subsequent cases."122 Students are taught not only that adherence to 
Concept in Judicial Research, 3 LAW & POL'Y Q. 291, 302-04 (1981); Thomas D. Ungs & 
Larry R. Baas, Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of Ohio Judges, 6 LAW & 
SOC'Y REV. 343, 343 (1972) .. 
116. Gibson, supra note 111, at 917. 
117. See id. One important dimension of role orientation concerns the criteria that 
judges consider to be legitimate determinants of decisions-that is, the extent to which 
factors other than existing case law can appropriately be considered. A judge who believes it 
is proper to be influenced by variables other than precedent is far more likely to be creative in 
her decisions (some might refer to her as an activist judge) than one who does not. See id. at 
917-18. 
118. It has been suggested, for example, that the greatest impact on the values of 
judges derives from career experiences. See C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the 
Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Courl Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberlies and 
Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 15 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 355, 359-60 (1981). 
119. See, e.g., RICHARD NEELY, JUDICIAL JEOPARDY: WHEN BUSINESS COLLIDES wrm 
THE COURTS 64 (1986) ("Students try to please their teachers throughout their lives; therefore, 
the type of education that a professional class receives influences the actions of that class for 
a generation.''). 
120. John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1 
n.2 (1983) (quoting Justice Arthur Goldberg). 
121. Id. (quoting Justice Stanley Reed). 
122. Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 3, 3 (1989). 
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precedent increases e:ffi.ciency123 and predictability, 124 but that justice in 
fact requires that like cases be treated alike.125 Precedent creates a 
reverence for the past that is almost certainly a value that influences 
attitude and helps define the relationship between role orientations and 
the legitimacy of various decision-making criteria126 
The concept of precedent is not necessarily confined to the 
courtroom; it is also used in nonlegal decision making. Often we give 
weight to prior decisions simply because they are similar to the 
situation at hand.127 In everyday explanations of behavior, this is what 
we call habit, especially if habit is conceptualized, as it is here, as an 
acquired behavioral disposition based on past conduct.128 Judges, too, 
surely acquire habits of decision making influenced by an allegiance to 
123. The use of precedent dispenses with the need for a judge to reinvent the law in 
each and every case. Justice Cardozo made this point when he stated that ''the labor of 
judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be 
reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure 
foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him." BENJAMINN. CARDOZO, 
THENATUREOFTHEJUDICIALPROCESS 149 (1921). 
124. Predictability is the most common justification for precedent. See David Lyons, 
Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 VAND. L. REv. 495, 496 (1985) (''The reason 
most often given for the practice of precedent is that it increases the predictability of judicial 
decisions.''); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 368 (1988) ("The 
most commonly heard justification for the doctrine of stare decisis rests on the need for 
certainty in the law.''). Without predictability, people would be unable to plan their affairs-
business or otherwise-with any degree of legal certainty. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare 
Decisis and Judicial Restraint, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1990, at 15, 18 (noting that predictability 
of outcome "is especially important in cases involving property rights and commercial 
transactions''). 
125. The justice argument can be summarized as follows: "Like cases must be treated 
alike or else someone is being treated unfairly; therefore, decision makers must treat the 
parties in the instant case the same as parties in earlier s:ases were treated." Theodore M. 
Benditt, The Rule of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 89, 90 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987). 
126. See supra notes 115-125 and accompanying text; see also Theodore L. Becker, A 
Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial Role Variations, 60 
AM. POL. Ser. REv. 677, 678-79 (1966) (suggesting that judges believe that the most 
important variable that can permissibly influence their behavior is precedent). 
127. See JOHN CH!PMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 198 
(MacMillan Co. 2d ed. 1921) (1909) ("Precedent has a very wide meaning. It covers 
everything said or done which furnishes a rule for subsequent practice, especially in matters 
of form or ceremony.''); Benditt, supra note 125, at 89 (''The idea of following precedent has 
a powerful hold on us, not only within law but also outside ofit.''). 
128. In simple terms, habit denotes one's customary way of behaving. It is a 
"relatively consistent pattern of thought or attitudes." J.P. CHAPLIN, DICTIONARY OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 210 (1968). As early as 1890, William James proposed that habits act as 
motivators and maintain social structure by providing continuity to experience and behavior. 
In his words, "Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative 
agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of 
fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor.'' 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 121 (Dover Publications, Inc. 1950) (1890). 
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precedent and an emotional attachment to the legal traditions taught in 
law school. Karl Llewellyn put it this way: 
The foundation, then, of precedent is the official analogue of what, in 
society at large, we know as folkways, or as institutions, and of what, in 
the individual, we know as habit. And the things which make for 
precedent in this broad sense are the same which make for habit and for 
institutions. It takes time and effort to solve problems. Once you have 
solved one it seems foolish to reopen it. Indeed, you are likely to be 
quite impatient with the notion of reopening it. Both inertia and 
convenience speak for building further on what you have already built; 
for incorporating the decision once made, the solution once worked out, 
into your operating technique without reexamination of what earlier 
went into reaching your solution. . . . Finally, it is clear that if the 
written records both exist and are somewhat carefully and continuously 
consulted, the possibility of change creeping into the practices 
unannounced is greatly lessened. . . . ['f]he lawyer searches the records 
for convenient cases . . . [and] capitalizes the hwnan drive toward 
repetition by finding, by making explicit, by urging, the prior cases.129 
The intellectual stubbornness brought on by habit may lead 
judges to reject not only optional innovations that may present 
themselves but may also provoke them to construe mandatory 
provisions as if no change had occurred. Dean Roscoe Pound 
provides a powerful example of the latter process in his appraisal of 
the Field Code of Procedure on the one-hundredth-year anniversary of 
its adoption by New York.130 The Field Code, truly a historic 
achievement, literally rid procedural law of centuries of accumulated 
archaisms and abolished the distinction between actions at law and 
suits in equity.131 The problem with its adoption, according to Pound, 
was that although the law was ripe for change, the legal profession was 
not.132 The courts were simply unwilling to take a constructive role in 
implementing the reforms contained in Field's remarkable code, 
preferring, instead, to maintain historical continuity.133 Some courts 
even went so far as to declare it beyond the reach of the legislature to 
129. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 64-65 
(1951); see also ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 82 (1938) 
(''Tenacity of a taught legal tradition is much more significant in our legal history than the 
economic conditions of time and place."). 
130. See Roscoe Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: 
CENTENARY EssAYS 3; 13-14 (Alison Reppy ed., 1949). 
131. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REY. 909, 931-39 (1987) 
(critiquing the merger oflaw and equity in the Field Code). 
132. See Pound, supra note 130, at 13-14. 
133. Seeid. 
1999] INERTIA OF HABIT 523 
alter a scheme so :fundamental as the division between law and 
equity.134 Moreover, the courts were not the only saboteurs of the 
Field Code; the law schools, too, contributed to the maintenance of the 
pre-Code system by refusing to teach the new law in the spirit in 
which it was written.135 
The inertia of habit, however, is not forever. Eventually, when 
the supporting environment for performance shifts (e.g., the law 
changes), new behaviors develop. Today, the innovations of the Field 
Code are accepted as a matter of course. Unfortunately, David Dudley 
Field would have needed to wait an additional eighty years to see his 
ideas finally take hold.136 
At this point, some are likely to remain skeptical about the 
contention that what is being called habit influences judicial behavior. 
They may argue that the analysis so far presented proves too little 
because there are other, more conventional, explanations for judicial 
decisions-for instance, the possibility that the court simply 
misunderstood the relevant law. But there is one distinct respect in 
which this criticism misses the point. This Article does not argue that 
an explanation based on habit is always preferred, nor that habit is 
always causal. The suggestion is only that habit may be a factor and 
134. See id. at 14. 
135. See id. In this connection, consider another interesting bit ofhistorical reflection: 
Man is the creature of habit To some extent doing away with conscious 
effort and deliberation permits a fuller life. On the other hand, being the slave of 
habit induces an indifferent acquiescence in things as they are and have been. 
Examine the history of the criminal code of England. Sir Samuel Romilly 
advocated and eventually secured the passage in the House of Commons of a bill 
to abolish the death penalty for stealing privately, in a shop, goods to the value of 
five shillings. But when this modest reform went to the House of Lords it was 
defeated by the united opposition of Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough and Lord 
Chancellor Eldon who consistently fought any change in the law, urging that the 
existing law was the very perfection of reason and that the criminal code could not 
be too severe. Ellenborough stormed and blustered and threatened, and Eldon 
implored and entreated and wept over the proposal to bring about "startling and 
dangerous innovations." Ellenborough summed up his views on tlte bill by saying: 
''There is a dangerous spirit of innovation abroad upon this subject, but against 
which I have ever and always shall be a steady opposer." Yes, it has truly been 
said that, for many, there is no pain as great and as hard to bear as the pain of a new 
idea 
Bernard L. Shientag, 11ze Human Element in Judicial and in Administrative Procedure, in 
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY EsSAYS, supra note 130, at 215, 218 (footnote omitted). 
136. As Pound points out 
Much of what is now accepted as a matter of course in legal procedure 
could have been attained at least eighty years before the Federal Rules of 1938 if 
Field's Code of Civil Procedure had been developed and applied in its spirit 
instead of in the spirit of maintaining historical continuity. 
Pound, supra note 130, at 14. 
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that paying attention to it will enhance our understanding of decision 
making. In order to explore ~s point further, let us consider some 
modem examples in which the close :functional relationship between 
habit and outcome may have been obscured by the potentially 
misleading nature of traditional explanations. 
A. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co. 
The well-known case Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. RP. Bartlett & Co. 
provides a perfect example of the force of habit that contributes to, and 
is inherent in, the judicial process.137 In Roto-Lith, the buyer, a 
manufacturer of cellophane bags, mailed the seller a written order to 
purchase a drum of ''N-132-C" emulsion, stating ''End use: wet pack 
spinach bags."138 The seller mailed the buyer an acknowledgment of 
the order three days later and shipped the goods on the next day.139 
The acknowledgment, which arrived no later than the goods, was a 
preprinted form. On the front, in conspicuous type, all warranties, 
express and implied, were disclaimed, and the sale was made "subject 
to the terms on the reverse side."140 On the reverse side, a clause stated 
that the buyer assumed the risk "for results obtained from use of these 
goods, whether used alone or in combination with other products."141 
Moreover, the form limited the seller's liability to "replacement of any 
goods that materially differ from the Seller's sample order on the basis 
of which the order for such goods was made."142 Finally, a clause 
provided that "[i]f these terms are not acceptable, Buyer must so notify 
Seller at once."143 The buyer accepted and paid for the goods without 
objection.144 When the emulsion proved to be defective and the buyer 
sought damages for breach of warranty, the court had to determine 
whether the disclaimer and the remedy limitation clauses in the seller's 
acknowledgment form relieved the seller of liability.145 
Consider what would have been the common-law response to the 
Roto-Lith facts and the seemingly inevitable tension between "freedom 
from contracf' and the modem business practice of using standard 
forms. According to traditional contract doctrine, an acceptance must 
137. 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962), overrnled by Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 
100 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 1997). 
13 8. Id. at 498 (internal quotations omitted). 
139. See id. 
140. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
141. Id. at 499 (internal quotations omitted). 
142. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
143. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
144. Seeid. 
145. See id. at 498. 
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be on the terms proposed by the offeror without the slightest variation. 
If there is a variance, no matter how minute, the purported acceptance 
acts as a counteroffer and thereby a rejection of the offer.146 Thus, 
application of the "ribbon-matching'' or "mirror-image" rule in Roto-
Lith would lead to the conclusion that because of the discrepancies in 
the buyer's order and the seller's acknowledgment, there was no 
contract when those forms were exchanged. But what about the fact 
that the buyer paid for and used the goods? 
A common-law corollary of the mirror-image rule is a maxim 
colorfully called ''the last-shot principle."147 This principle is premised 
on the simple notion that once the parties have performed, there is a 
contract, and since each form subsequent to the first is a counteroffer, 
the resulting contract must be on the terms of the party who sends the 
last counteroffer, which is then accepted by the other party's 
performance. 148 Therefore, the controlling terms are those contained 
in the last shot fired. 149 In Roto-Lith, because the seller had the good 
fortune to fire last, the terms in its acknowledgment would define the 
contract. 150 Thus, the common-law result would be that seller 
breached no warranty and, in any event, limited its liability to 
replacement of the goods. 
However, Roto-Lith was not a common-law case governed by 
common-law rules. 151 Rather, for the first time, the court was given 
the opportunity to apply section 2-207 of the Code to the ''battle of the 
146. See RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., SALES AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 508 (5th ed. 
1993) ("Every student knows of the 'mirror-image' rule of general contract law: An 
'acceptance' which varies the tenns of an offer is not an acceptance at all, but a counter-
offer."); see also Dickey v. Hurd, 33 F.2d 415, 418-19 (1st Cir. 1929) (holding that the 
language of an acceptance must be "unequivocal, unconditional, and without variance''); 
Langellierv. Schaefer, 31N.W.690, 691(Minn.1887) (holding that an acceptance is vitiated 
by "[any] qualification of departure from" the tenns of an offer); Poe! v. Brunswick-Balke-
Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619, 621-22 (N.Y. 1915) (holding that an acceptance must not vary 
from the offered terms); REsrATEMENT (FIRSr) OF CoNrRACTS § 60 (1932) ("A reply to an 
offer, though purporting to accept it, which adds qualifications or requires performance of 
conditions, is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer."); K.N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law 
of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, I, 48 YALE L.J. 1, 30 (1938). 
147. At least one writer has attributed this term to Professor William Hawkland. See 
Frederick D. Lipman, On Winning the Battle of the Forms: An Analysis of Section 2-207 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 Bus. LAW. 789, 792-93 (1969). 
148. See Paul Barron & Thomas W. Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207: Review, 
Reflection and Revision, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 171, 176-77 (1975); Daniel A. Levin & Ellen 
Blumberg Rubert, Beyond U.C.C. Section 2-207: Should Professor Mu"ay's Proposed 
Revision Be Adopted?, 11 J.L. & CoM. 175, 177-78 (1992). 
149. See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 148, at 176-77. 
150. See Roth-Lith, 297 F.2d at 498-99. 
151. Seeid.at499. 
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fonns."152 The drafters intended this section to alter substantially the 
common-law mirror-image rule by providing in subsection (1) that an 
expression of acceptance creates a binding contract, even though it 
contains additional or different terms, unless the acceptance is coupled 
with language making it conditional upon the offeror's assent to the 
new tenns.153 If the offeree does not use such conditional language, 
the new terms are to be treated as proposals for additions to the 
contract already created.154 Between ''merchants," such terms become 
part of the contract unless, inter alia, they materially alter it.155 
The Roto-Lith court was unwilling to countenance such a 
fundamental change from common-law doctrine: 
Perhaps it would be wiser in all cases for an offeree to say in so many 
words, ''I will not accept your offer until you assent to the following: 
* * *" But businessmen cannot be expected to act by rubric. It would 
be unrealistic to suppose that when an offeree replies setting out 
conditions that would be burdensome only to the offeror he intended to 
make an unconditional acceptance of the original offer, leaving it 
simply to the offeror's good nature whether he would assume the 
additional restrictions. To give the statute a practical construction we 
must hold that a response which states a condition materially altering 
the obligation solely to the disadvantage of the offeror is an "acceptance 
* * * exnressly * * * conditional on assent to the additional * * * 
terms."15"6 
This was the court's first misstep. Totally ignored was the treatment of 
material additions in subsection (2).157 If the addition of a material 
term in the offeree's response automatically creates a counteroffer, 
then why does subsection (2) characterize it as a "proposalO for 
addition to the contract''?158 Quite clearly, a proposal for addition to 
the contract is a far different thing than a counteroffer. By 
misconstruing the Code in this manner, the court effectively applied 
the mirror-image rule. 
The court's second misstep occurred when it brought back to life 
the last-shot doctrine and held that the buyer became bound by the 
terms in the seller's acknowledgment when it accepted the goods with 
152. See id. The First Circuit applied Massachusetts law, and the Code in that state 
was enacted in 1958,just four years before the case was decided. See id. 
153. See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 148, at 176-79. 
154. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1998). 
155. See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 148, at 181-83 n.32. 
156. Roto-Lith, 297 F.2d at 500. 
157. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2). 
158. Id.; see also Roto-Lith, 297 F.2d at 499 (quoting section 2-207). 
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knowledge of those tenns.159 This time the court failed to consider 
section 2-207(3), which the drafters added primarily to cover the 
situation where the initial exchange of fonns has not resulted in a 
contract, but the parties perform as if they had a contract.160 In such 
cases, the tenns of the contract "consist of those tenns on which the 
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplemental}' tenns 
incorporated under any other provisions of this [Code]."161 Thus, 
subsection (3) avoids the unfair imposition of the last-shot rule. If it 
had been properly applied in Roto-Lith, the seller's disclaimer and 
remedy limitations clauses would not have been part of the contract. 
By now, courts162 and commentators163 alike acknowledge that 
the Roto-Lith court frustrated the purpose of section 2-207 and 
159. See Roto-Lith, 297 F.2d at 500. 
160. See William D. Hawkland, Jn Re Articles 1, 2 and 6, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 512, 525 
(1955). 
Id. 
Amended subsection [(3)] continues a rule of basic contract law which 
makes enforceable "implied" contracts formed by the conduct of the parties. 
While the subsection is undoubtedly redundant, it was included by the draftsmen to 
make it clear that subsequent performance by the parties can save a contract, even 
though initially no binding agreement had been formed because of the conflict of 
forms. 
161. u.c.c. § 2-207(3). 
162. See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. (America) v. Jordan fut'! Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1235 n.5 
{7th Cir. 1977) (noting that Roto-Lith has been criticized by commentators and not followed 
by courts); Alloy Computer Prods., fuc. v. Northern Telecom, fuc., 683 F. Supp. 12, 14-15 
(D. Mass. 1988) (following Roto-Lith notwithstanding the argument that "Roto-Lith has been 
subjected to academic and judicial criticism, because it reverses the outcome that the plain 
language of§ 2-207 would lead parties to expect"); Leonard Pevar Co. v. Evans Prods. Co., 
524 F. Supp. 546, 551 (D. Del. 1981) ("Roto-Lith ... does not reflect the underlying 
principles of the Code.''); Ebasco Servs., fuc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 402 F. 
Supp. 421, 437 (E.D. Pa 1975) ("Roto-Lith .•• has not been treated kindly by the cases or the 
commentators.''); Uniroyal, fuc., v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co., 380 N.E.2d 571, 578 (fud. 
Ct App. 1978) (stating that Roto-Lith ''revives the 'last-shot' technique" and "subvert[s] the 
very purpose of§ 2-207''). 
163. fu the first edition of their well-known casebook, Professors James White and 
Robert Summers used the phrase "infamous case" to descnbe Roto-Lith. See JAMES J. WHITE 
& ROBERr S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF TiiE LAW UNDER TiiE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE 
26 (1972); see also William B. Davenport, How to Handle Sales of Goods: The Problem of 
Conflicting Purchase Orders and Acceptances and New Concepts in Contract Law, 19 Bus. 
LAW. 75, 85-86, 86 n.30 (1963) ("fu the course ofits opinion the court remarked with respect 
to § 2-207, 'The statute is not too happily drafted.' The draftsmen of the Code could, with 
equal propriety, say of Roto-Lith, 'The opinion is not too happily written.'" (citation 
omitted)). Nor did Roto-Lith fare better in the plethora of student notes it generated. See, 
e.g., Note, Nonconforming Acceptances Under Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code: An End to the Battle of the Forms, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 540 (1963); Recent Case, 111 
U. PA. L. REv. 132 (1962); Recent Case, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1481 {1963). But see Note, 
Uniform Commercial Code: Variation Between Offer and Acceptance Under Section 2-207, 
1962 DUKEL.J. 613, 617 (characterizing Roto-Lith as "an equitable recognition ofreasonable 
commercial expectations''). 
528 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:495 
produced one of the most egregious misinterpretations of the Code to 
date. Surely the critics are right that section 2-207 is a "miserable, 
bungled, patched-up job," and "arguably the greatest statutory mess of 
all time."164 But such a view certainly cannot excuse the court's error, 
nor is it a sufficient explanation of why it occurred. According to the 
account of judicial decision making advanced here, the court's 
application of the statute cannot be so easily disentangled from the 
judges' background characteristics, including their preferences and 
attitudes. 
Recall that Roto-Lith was decided in 1962. Each judge on the 
panel received his legal education before the Code was enacted, and 
each was appointed to the bench when the mirror-image rule was 
being applied by courts ''with a rigor worthy of a better cause."165 
Presumably, here is a case where the longtime habit of taught law 
resulted in an intellectual attitude toward the issues that clouded the 
judges' reading of the new Code and provided an alternative set of 
rules for the court to apply. Only after thirty-five years of criticism 
and a revision of the official comments to section 2-207166 did the First 
Circuit finally admit its mistake in Roto-Lith.167 This time the panel 
consisted of three judges for whom experience and learning had led to 
a habit of taught law that was decidedly different. 
164. Letter from Grant Gilmore to Robert S. Summers (Sept. 10, 1980), in SALES AND 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra note 146, at 513, 514. 
165. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONfRACTS § 2-21, at 
102 (3d ed. 1987). The judges who participated in Roto-Lith were Bailey Aldrich (LL.B., 
1932), John Hartigan (LL.B., 1913), and Peter Woodbwy (LL.B., 1927). 
166. The official comments to section 2-207 were revised in 1966, evidently in 
response to the Roto-Lith case. In particular, a new comment 7 was added, which reads as 
follows: 
In many cases, as where goods are shipped, accepted and paid for before 
any dispute arises, there is no question whether a contract has been made. In such 
cases, where the writings of the parties do not establish a contract, it is not 
necessary to determine which act or document constituted the offer and which the 
acceptance. The only question is what terms are included in the contract, and 
subsection (3) furnishes the governing rule. 
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 7 (1998) (citation omitted). 
167. See Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184, 188-90 (1st Cir. 1997). 
The court clearly rejected the doctrine that the buyer's acceptance of the goods constitutes an 
acceptance of the seller's terms, i.e., the last-shot rule. Not explicitly ovenuled, however, 
was the holding in Roto-Lith that a response materially altering the offer is expressly 
conditional under section 2-207(1 ). Presumably, it was not necessary for the court to address 
this issue because the seller's form in Ionics, in fine print, stated that the seller was willing to 
sell, "BUT ONLY UPON THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS SET FORTH HEREIN AND 
ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF AS A COUNTEROFFER." Id. at 185 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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[I]n both the basic course on Contracts and advanced courses on Sales, 
teachers and casebook authors have routinely denounced ... Roto-Lith, 
Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co. for the past thirty years. Indeed, many first-
year students have realized that the Roto-Lith court not only distorted 
the text of section 2-207, but also subverted the purposes of the Code 
by applying the mirror image and last shot rules to an exchange of form 
documents. An entire generation of lawyers and judges has thus 
learned that neither mirror image nor last shot belongs in Article 2.168 
This discussion suggests that when intellectual habit no longer 
corresponds to features of the legal environment, the habit will change. 
However, the story of Roto-Lith proves that we may have to wait for 
the next generation oflawyers and judges before this happens. 
B. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American National Bank 
A second example of the influence of the intellectual habit of 
taught law on judicial decision making is International Harvester 
Credit Corp. v. American National Bank, in which the Florida 
Supreme Court addressed for the first time the rule of priority 
contained in UCC section 9-312(4).169 On April 8, 1969, the borrower 
in that case, Machek Farms, Inc., executed an installment note and 
security agreement in favor of American National Bank.170 The 
security interest encompassed equipment presently owned by Machek 
and also equipment that might be acquired in the future. 171 On April 
25, 1969, Machek purchased, on credit, two items of farm equipment 
from Florida Truck and Tractor Company. 172 Florida Truck retained a 
security interest in these items, but no financing statement was ever 
filed.173 On August 8, 1969, seven additional items of equipment were 
purchased from Florida Truck on similar terms.174 Florida Truck 
subsequently assigned the August 8 contract to International Harvester 
Corporation.175 On September 3, 1969, more than ten days after 
168. Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Castles in the Air: Blanket Assent and the Revision of 
Article2, 51 WASH. &LEEL. REv. 599, 658 (1994) (footnotes omitted). 
169. 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla 1974). Section 9-312(4) provides: "A purchase money 
security interest in collateral other than inventory has priority over a conflicting security 
interest in the same collateral or its proceeds if the purchase money security interest is 
perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten days 
thereafter." U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1998). 
170. See American Nat' I Bank v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 269 So. 2d 726, 
727 (Fla Dist Ct App. 1972), rev'd, 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla 1974). 
171. Seeid. 
172. Seeid. 
173. Seeid. 
174. Seeid. 
175. Seeid. 
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Machek received possession of the equipment, International Harvester 
filed a financing statement.176 After Machek defaulted on both 
contracts, it voluntarily returned all of the equipment purchased to 
Florida Truck.177 On December 7, 1970, American National Bank 
instituted a replevin suit seeking possession of the farm equipment on 
the basis of its earlier-in-time security agreement and financing 
statement.178 
The question thus became: Does a previously perfected security 
interest in after-acquired property take priority over the interest held by 
a purchase money secured party who failed to file within the ten-day 
grace period of section 9-312(4)?179 It is doubtful that anyone 
schooled in article 9 would give the wrong answer to such a simple, 
straightforward question. Every law student who takes a course in 
article 9 is taught that if the seller or lender advancing the funds for the 
purchase of goods fails to file within ten days after the debtor receives 
the goods, the special purchase money priority is lost and, therefore, 
the relative priority of the claimants is to be decided according to the 
rules of section 9-312(5).180 This will usually mean that the secured 
party who files first will have priority. Since American National Bank 
filed to perfect its security interest in Machek's after-acquired 
176. Seeid. 
177. See id. 
178. Seeid. 
179. See U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1998). The tenn ''purchase money security interest" is 
defined in section 9-107, which provides.that a security interest is purchase money to the 
extent that it is: 
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; 
or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives 
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value 
is in fact so used. 
Id.§ 9-107. 
180. See, e.g., 2 GRANT GIIMORE, SECURITY INrEREsTs IN PERSONAL PROPERrY § 29-
5, at 799 (1965) (''The one condition for priority under§ 9-312(4) is that the purchase-money 
interest be perfected 'at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten 
days thereafter.'" (quoting u.c.c. § 9-312(4))); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT s. SUMMERS, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 24-5, at 868 (4th ed. 1995) ("[W]hat rule governs priority if 
the purchase money lender fails to comply with subsections (3) or (4) ... ? [That] case is 
clearly governed by subsection (5) ... .'). At the time of the International Harvester 
decision, section 9-312(5) of the Code provided in pertinent part: 
(5) In all cases not governed by the rules stated in this section (including 
cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special 
priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section), priority between 
conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined . . . in the 
order offiling if both are perfected by filing .... 
U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1962). This subsection was revised as part of the 1972 official revision of 
article 9, but not in a way that would have changed the court's analysis or the proper 
resolution of this case. 
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equipment long before International Harvester filed, American 
National Bank should have prevailed.181 
While the result might seem obvious to today's law student, the 
Florida Supreme Court, in a "masterpiece of statutory destruction,"182 
held otherwise. The court began its opinion by recognizing that a 
security interest in after-acquired property has priority under section 9-
312(5) unless the purchase money security interest is filed within the 
requisite ten-day period.183 So far, so good. However, the court 
completely negated this priority by concluding that it is limited to the 
debtor's equity, if any, in the property.184 In most cases, this would be 
tantamount to having no interest at all. In reaching such an 
"inexplicable result,"185 the court relied on unspecified constitutional 
and equitable principles that would be violated by granting a 
''windfall" to the secured party with the interest in after-acquired 
property.186 Moreover, the court was influenced by the concept of title 
that is expressed as follows: ''There really are no conflicting security 
interests in this situation. That security interest retained by the 
subsequent seller in the after-acquired property never passes to the 
buyer-debtor and thus never becomes subject to the earlier creditor's 
claim of security interest in such after-acquired property."187 The 
court's holding subverts the drafters' clear intent to make the location 
of title irrelevant for article 9 priority purposes.188 
181. Every other court that had decided this issue would have awarded priority to 
American National Bank. See, e.g., United States v. Baptist Golden Age Home, 226 F. Supp. 
892 (W.D. Aik. 1964); National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone Co., 191N.E.2d471 (Mass. 
1963); James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1972); American 
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 473 P.2d 234 (Okla 1970); Wilson v. 
Burrows, 497 P.2d 240 (Utah 1972); Burlington Nat'l Bank v. Strauss, 184 N.W.2d 122 (Wis. 
1971). 
182. See Barkley Clark, Secured Transactions, 42 Bus. LAW. 1333, 1377 (1987). 
183. See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32, 
33-34 (Fla 1974). 
184. See id. Justice Carlton, in a lengthy dissent, makes the point that the majority 
actually awarded priority to the purchase money creditor: 
When the property is sold to satisfy the debts, the purchase money loan is paid off 
first; anything left over is the debtor's equity, and this goes to the owner of the 
security interest in after-acquired property. What would have happened if the 
owner of the purchase money security interest had filed it within ten days and 
received an absolute priority? The result would be exactly the same! 
Id. at 44 (Carlton, J., dissenting). 
185. See RAY D. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED 'TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE 
UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 5-3, at 129 n.36 (2d ed. 1979). 
186. See International Harvester, 296 So. 2d at 34-35. 
187. Id. at34. 
188. See U.C.C. § 9-202 (1998) ("Each provision of this Article with regard to rights, 
obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the 
debtor."); see also id. § 1-201(37) (''The retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods 
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Can the ·court's reasoning be defended? No, but it can be 
explained. As the discussion below shows, the opinion has its roots in 
pre-Code law when the purchase money interest was even more 
favored by courts and legislatures than it is today. The result of 
International Harvester was to expand the purchase money priority 
significantly, in effect, restoring it to its pre-Code vigor. 
As early as 1631, in Nash v. Preston, the English courts adopted 
the basic proposition that a purchase money lien is something special 
and should prevail over antecedent claims against the debtor or his 
property.189 At that time, however, the priority of the lien was subject 
to significant limitations. Initially, its recognition was restricted to the 
field of real property, and it was used only to protect the purchase 
money creditor against such competing claimants as judgment 
creditors and those who asserted claims of dower, courtesy, and 
community property.190 To explain this special priority, courts used the 
doctrine of transitory or instantaneous seisin: ''The idea is that title 
shot into the grantee and out of him again into the purchase money 
mortgagee so fleetingly-quasi uno flattu, in one breath, as it were--
that no other interest had time to fasten itself to it."191 
Rationalized in this way, it was unclear whether a lender who had 
merely provided the debtor with the necessary funds to make the 
purchase was also entitled to claim purchase money status. Other 
issues, such as the priority of the purchase money security interest over 
a creditor with an interest in after-acquired property, were also left 
unexplored. Thus, as American courts began to develop an indigenous 
law of security interests in personal property security, they had a 
modest and somewhat incomplete background against which to 
build.192 
With few exceptions, there was no need for American courts in 
the early part of the nineteenth century to decide the type of issue that 
confronted the court in International Harvester. Courts were not 
concerned with this particular priority problem because the interest in 
after-acquired property was long considered to be "merely equitable" 
until the creditor was able to transform it into a legal interest by taking 
notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (Section 2-401) is limited in effect to a 
reservation of a 'security interest."'); id. § 2-401(1) ("Any retention or reservation by the 
seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a 
reservation ofa security interest."). 
189. 79Eng.Rep. 767(K.B.1631). 
190. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 180, § 28.1, at 743-48. The historical discussion in 
the text relies in large measure on Gilmore's classic treatise. 
191. GEORGEE. OSBORNE, HANDBOOKONTHELAWOFMORTGAGES 557-58 (1951). 
192. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 180, § 28.1, at 743-48. 
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possession of the property or by filing a supplemental mortgage.193 
While the after-acquired property interest remained equitable, the 
priority of the purchase money lien was never questioned. It was not 
until the United States Supreme Court decided a series of railroad 
finance cases that the legal environment began to change. 
The first significant case was Pennock v. Coe.194 Responding to 
the economic realities of the time and the special needs of railroad 
finance, the Supreme Court approved the idea that railroad mortgages 
should include after-acquired property.195 It was satisfied ''that the 
mortgage attached to the future acquisitions, as described in it, from 
the time they crune into existence" and thus had a "superior equity'' 
over the claims of judgment creditors.196 This decision encouraged 
state courts to extend recognition to after-acquired property interests, 
and even more venturesome state legislatures enacted statutes 
validating after-acquired property clauses in railroad and public utility 
mortgages.197 Finally, the time was ripe for a contest between the 
purchase money lien and the prior interest in after-acquired property. 
The Supreme Court was given the opportunity to resolve this 
issue in United States v. New Orleans Railroad.198 In this 1870 case, 
two locomotives and ten cars (rolling stock) were subject to both 
unrecorded security interests in the form of purchase money bonds and 
the terms of an earlier recorded mortgage containing an after-acquired 
property clause.199 Justice Bradley wrote: 
The appellants contend, in the next place, that the decision upon the 
facts was erroneous; that the mortgages, being prior in date to the bond 
given for the purchase-money of these locomotives and cars, and being 
expressly made to include after-acquired property, attached to the 
property as soon as it was purchased, and displaced any junior lien. 
This, we apprehend, is an erroneous view of the doctrine by which 
after-acquired property is made to serve the uses of a mortgage. That 
193. See id.§ 28.1, at 746; see also Metropolitan Trust Co. v. R.R. Equip. Co., 108 F. 
913 (6th Cir. 1901) (holding that title remained in the vendor until the purchase money lien 
was paid fully, and that a mortgagee's interest was merely equitable); Southern Sur. Co. v. 
Peoples State Bank, 163 N.E. 659 (Ill. App. Ct 1928) (holding that the validity of a lien 
depends on the mortgagee's taking possession of the goods). 
194. 64 U.S. (23 How.) 117 (1860). 
195. See id. at 130. The Court observed that "[t]here are many cases in this country 
confirming this doctrine, and which have led to the practice extensively of giving this sort of 
security, especially in railroad and other similar great and important enterprises of the day." 
Id. 
196. Id. at 130-31. 
197. See 2 GIIMORE, supra note 180, § 28.1, at 748. 
198. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362 (1870). Gilmore refers to this case as a ''monument of our 
jurisprudence." See 2 GIIMORE, supra note 180, § 28.1, at 745. 
199. See New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 364-65. 
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doctrine is IDtended to subserve the pmposes of justice, and not 
IDjustice. Such an application of it as is sought by the appellants would 
often result ID gross IDjustice. A mortgage IDtended to cover after-
acquired property can only attach itself to such property ID the condition 
ID which it comes IDto the mortgagor's hands. If that property is 
already subject to mortgages or other liens, the general mortgage does 
not displace them, though they may be junior to it ID poIDt of time. It 
only attaches to such IDterest as the mortgagor acquires; and if he 
purchase[ s] property and give[ s] a mortgage for the purchase-money, 
the deed which he receives and the mortgage which he gives are 
regarded as one transaction, and no general lien impendillg over him, 
whether ID the shape of a general mortgage, or judgment, or 
recognizance, can displace such mortgage for purchase-money. And ID 
such cases a failure to register the mortgage for purchase-money makes 
no difference. It does not come withill the reason of the registry laws. 
These laws are IDtended for the protection of subsequent, not prior, 
purchasers and creditors.200 
If all of this sounds familiar, it should. Justice Bradley's language 
captures perfectly the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning in 
International Harvester. 
After the New Orleans Railroad case, the breadth of the purchase 
money priority continued to grow, spreading from railroad rolling 
stock to other forms of property.201 The priority was not dependent 
upon whether the purchase money creditor was a vendor who had 
retained title to the property under a conditional sale arrangement, or 
was a lender who had financed the purchase.202 Nor did it matter 
whether the purchase money creditor had properly filed the agreement 
or even whether the transaction was valid against third parties under 
state law.203 The purchase money priority lien did, indeed, reign 
supreme. 
200. Id. 
201. See 2 GIIMORE, supra note 180, § 28.3, at 753. 
202. See id. § 28.2, at 749. 
203. See id. § 28.2, at 748-49; see also Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914) (providing 
relief to a purchase money creditor who failed to register); Myer v. Western Car Co., 102 
U.S. 1 (1880) (deciding in favor of a purchase money creditor despite his failure to register); 
Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235 (1879) (holding that a vendor's failure to register does not 
defeat the priority of his lien because a mortgagee can take only the interest in property that a 
mortgagor acquired); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. G.W. Parsons Co., 235 F. 114 (8th 
Cir. 1916) (providing relief to a purchase money creditor despite the fact that the failure to 
file made the lien invalid as to third parties under state law); Manhattan Trust Co. v. Sioux 
City Cable Ry., 76 F. 658 (N.D. Iowa 1896) (holding that the vendor retained property despite 
its failure to file in accordance with state statute). In instances where the after-acquired 
property lienor could demonstrate that it actually advanced funds in reliance upon the 
appearance of the debtor's unencumbered interest in the purchase money property, the result 
was sometimes otherwise. See, e.g., Spencer v. Staines, 291 N.W. 50 (Mich. 1940) (holding 
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The foregoing history of the purchase money lien was not lost on 
the drafters of article 9. While the pre-Code bias in favor of purchase 
money liens is continued, the drafters make clear in the official 
comments to section 9-312 (if the black letter language of the section 
were not clear enough) that the purchase money creditor must now 
take certain perfection steps if she wishes to escape from the basic 
first-in-time priority rule.204 Notwithstanding a statute that modernizes 
personal property security law and achieves a sensible balance of 
interests, the influence of pre-Code law was seemingly too strong for 
the Florida court to overcome. It was not until the legislature 
eventually stepped in and amended section 9-312 that the intellectual 
habit of taught law was :finally broken. 205 
C. Diefenbach v. Gomey 
The discussion in this Part has already indicated that the idea of 
title was not so easily dislodged from the realm of article 9, 
notwithstanding the drafters' pronouncement in section 9-202 that 
theories of title retention were not to interfere with the Code's explicit 
allocation of rights, obligations, and remedies. Another part of the 
Code in which the drafters sought to virtually abolish the concept of 
''title" or ''property" is article 2.206 In pre-Code days, the concept 
served as a jack-of-all-trades in sales law. One only had to decide who 
had title, and then the answers would neatly follow to such diverse 
questions as where the risk of loss lay, whether the seller could 
maintain an action for the price, whether the buyer could replevy the 
goods, and whether the seller's or buyer's creditors could levy on the 
goods.2°7 But, for Karl Llewellyn, the neatness of such a singularity of 
issue was not worth the price: 
that a statute requiring filing was intended for the protection of creditors during the period 
before filing); Mississippi Valley Trust Co., v. Cosmopolitan Club, Inc., 162 A. 396 (N.J. Ch. 
1932) (holding that a mortgagee who advanced large sums while unaware of an untiled lien 
of purchase money creditor was protected). 
204. See U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt 4 (1998) (''Note that subsection (5) applies to cases of 
purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special priorities set forth in 
subsections (3) and (4)."). 
205. In 1978, the Florida Legislature amended section 9-312(4) by adding the 
following sentence: ''Failure to so perfect shall cause the priority of said purchase money 
security interest to be determined under subsection (5)." See 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-222 
(codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ch. 679.312 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999)). However, it 
was not until 1986 that the Florida Supreme Court finally put International Harvester to rest 
in ITT Industrial Credit Co. v. Regan, 481 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1986). 
206. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2-401 cmt 1 (1998). 
207. See 1 STATEOFNEWYORK, REPoRrOFTHELAwREvlsroNCOMMISSIONFOR 1955: 
STUDY OF THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 445 (1955) [hereinafter 1955 NEW YORK 
CoMMISSION REPoRr]; see also K.N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 
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The quarrel thus is, first, with the use of Title for purposes of decision 
as if the location of Title were determinable with certainty; and second, 
with the insistence on reaching for a single lump to solve all or most of 
the problems between seller and buyer-and even in regard to third 
parties.2°8 
Thus, when the drafting of the Code began, Llewellyn was 
convinced that the time had come to scrap title as a means to resolve 
sales controversies. The unpredictability of application209 and 
emptiness of rational content210 of title led Llewellyn to fear the effects 
of enshrining the prominent role of title in the Code. As he saw it, 
elimination of the doctrine was "one of the great clarifications that has 
been offered to the law of these United States over many years."211 
Making the most of their opportunity, Llewellyn and his crew of 
drafters made the bold move of relegating title to backseat status in 
article 2.212 In its place are specific rules premised on considerations 
peculiar to the problem at hand.213 Gone is the one-issue-fits-all 
approach of pre-Code law. 
But the drafters did not completely ignore the concept of titie. 
Section 2-401, for example, provides rules for determining who has 
title, if that matters.214 The preamble to the section indicates the 
limited relevance of the section's rules.215 The rules should be 
15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 159, 169 (1938) (calling the concept of title in the sales context "an 
alien lump, undigested'). 
208. Llewellyn, supra note 207, at 166. 
209. Llewellyn explained: ''Nobody ever saw a chattel's Title. Its location in Sales 
cases is not discovered, but created, often ad hoc." Id. at 165. 
210. Referring to the concept of title, Llewellyn fancifully wrote, ''when, in addition, 
'the property' bounces around from party to party according to the issue, it begins to look as 
if 'the property in the goods,' as an issue-determiner, were in the mercantile cases a farmer 
far from the dell, and none too well adjusted to the new environment." K.N. Llewellyn, 
Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REv. 725, 733 (1939). 
211. 1954 NEW YORK CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 160. 
212. The unimportance of the location of title is a theme the drafters thought worthy of 
repetition. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-401 cmt. 1, 2-505 cmt. 1, 2-706 cmts. 3, 11 (1998). 
Although most members of the academic community were pleased with the Code's 
reformation of existing law, see, e.g., Arthur Linton Corbin, The Uniform Commercial 
Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 824-27 (1950); Elvin R. Latty, Sales 
and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3-8 (1951), there were 
those who were not. See, e.g., Samuel Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform 
Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561, 561-72, 588 (1950). 
213. For example, the Code prescribes a separate set of rules on risk of loss, see 
U.C.C. §§ 2-509 to -510 (1998), the buyer's right to replevin, see id. § 2-716, and the seller's 
right to recover the purchase price, see id. § 2-709. 
214. See id. § 2-401. 
215. Seeid. 
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consulted only if a Code "provision refers to such title"216 or when 
"situations are not covered by the other provisions of this Article and 
matters concerning title become material."217 The reference in the 
official comment to the class of relevant title situations serves only to 
remind one that title will no longer be used to solve sales problems. It 
still may be necessary, however, to the application of various 
regulatory statutes.218 
It is surprising, but true, that notwithstanding Llewellyn's 
celebrated effort to demolish the importance of title by showing its 
tendency toward vacuity and by drafting rules to decide sales 
controversies in terms of objective facts, not all courts were 
immediately able to absorb the changes. Perhaps the area in which the 
pre-Code preoccupation with title lingered the longest was risk of loss. 
After all, when those who sat on the bench in the early days of the 
Code received their legal training, the concept of title was, and for 
generations had been, the vehicle used to allocate risk.219 For some, 
the fact that article 2 abandoned this approach just did not seem to 
matter. 
For example, the court in Diefenbach v. Gorney was not merely 
influenced by pre-Code law but actually decided the case on the basis 
of that law, notwithstanding the Code.220 In Diefenbach, the seller was 
a fanner who sold hay at auction with terms announced as "Cash 
Before Removal."221 The buyer was the high bidder, but as it turned 
out, he was short on cash.222 With only $500 in his pocket at the time, 
216. Id. Several Code sections, typically oflittle importance, do contain a reference to 
title. See id. § 2-312 (warranty of title); id. §§ 2-326(3), 2-327(1) (incidents of sale or return); 
id. § 2-501(2) (seller's insurable interest in goods); id. § 2-722 (cause of action for injury to 
goods). In addition, one important provision, section 2-403(1), pertaining to security of 
purchase and good faith purchase rules, also references title. 
217. Id. § 2-401. 
218. The comments to section 2-401 provide: 
This section, however, in no way intends to indicate which line of interpretation 
should be followed in cases where the applicability of ''public" regulation depends 
upon a "sale" or upon location of ''title" without further definition. . . . It is 
therefore necessary to state what a "sale" is and when title passes under this Article 
in case the courts deem any public regulation to incorporate the defined term of the 
''private" law. 
Id. cmt l; see, e.g., State v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 356 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Ala Civ. App. 
1978) (using section 2-401 to decide a sales tax issue); Elliot v. State, 254 S.E.2d 900, 901 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (using section 2-401 to decide a criminal law issue). 
219. For a discussion of pre-Code risk ofloss rules, see infra text accompanying notes 
228-233. 
220. 234 N.E.2d 813, 814 (Ill. App. Ct 1968). 
221. See id. 
222. Seeid. 
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he was permitted to remove only $500 worth of hay.223 Some months 
later, when the buyer returned to the seller's farm to pay for and take 
possession of the remainder of the hay, he discovered that it was 
gone.224 The seller, who was no longer living on the farm, had no 
explanation for the hay's mysterious disappearance.225 
Notwithstanding his inability to deliver the hay, the seller sued and 
received a judgment for the balance of the purchase price.226 Although 
one could make the argument that this was a correct result under the 
Code, it is not an exaggeration to say that, today, no one with even the 
slightest exposure to article 2 would suggest that the court's reasoning 
was correct. In a nutshell, the court's justification for its decision in 
favor of the seller was as follows: "At a public auction, as soon as the 
property is '!mocked down' to the bidder, the title to the property 
passes to the bidder, subject however, to a lien on the property in favor 
of the seller for the amount of the bid."227 
Be that as it may, the court's reasoning rested on a presumption 
of continuity with pre-Code law first announced in 1827 by the King's 
Bench in the venerable case of Tarling v. Baxter.228 Indeed, the factual 
and analytical similarities between Tarling and Diefenbach are 
startling. Tarling, too, involved the sale of hay which was lost (it 
burned) prior to the time it was paid for and delivered.229 The court 
thought it "quite clear that the loss must fall upon him in whom the 
property was vested at the time when it was destroyed by fire."230 
Thus, the only question that had to be answered was where ''the 
property'' was located. Since the contract referred to a specific stack of 
hay, and the seller had nothing further to do, the court determined that 
''the property'' passed to the buyer when the contract was made, even 
though the buyer did not have possession and would not have even the 
right to possession until the price was paid or tendered.231 It should be 
noted that the decision in Tarling later served as the model for the risk 
of loss rules contained in the British Sale of Goods Act,232 which, in 
223. Seeid. 
224. Seeid. 
225. Seeid. 
226. Seeid. 
227. Id. 
228. 108 Eng. Rep. 484 (K.B. 1827). 
229. See id. at 485. 
230. Id. at486. 
231. Seeid. 
232. See Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Viet, ch. 71, § 20 (Eng.) ("[W]hen the 
property [in the goods] is transferred to the buyer, the goods are at the buyer's risk whether 
delivery has been made or not"). Section 18 of the Act provides the following rule for 
pinpointing the moment when the property in the goods passes to the buyer: ''Where there is 
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tum, served as the model for the Uniform Sales Act that Professor 
Williston drafted in 1906.233 
Again, the Code rejects ''property'' or "title" as the test for 
determining when risk of loss has passed. Instead, if the seller is in 
possession of goods to be delivered to the buyer without shipment, 
section 2-509(3) provides that ''the risk of loss passes to the buyer on 
his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the risk 
passes to buyer on tender of delivery."234 This radical change from 
pre-Code law minimizes cases where the risk shifts to the buyer before 
the seller has transferred possession and control of the goods.235 
Implicit in the Code's approach is the assumption that before goods 
change hands, the seller is the one who is more likely to be insured 
against the loss.236 Although section 2-509(3) might have changed the 
result in Diefenbach, the court never mentioned it.237 Interestingly, the 
an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods, in a deliverable state, the property in 
the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the 
time of payment or the time of delivery, or both, be postponed." Id. § 18 rule 1. 
233. See UNIF. SALES Acr § 22 (1906), 3B U.L.A. 487-88 (1992) (replicating section 
20 of the English Sale of Goods Act verbatim); id. § 19 rule 1, 3B U.L.A. 485 (replicating 
section 18, rule 1 of the English Sale of Goods Act). 
234. u.c.c. § 2-509(3) (1998). 
235. In the typical case, the seller, by any standard, will be a ''merchanf' and, 
therefore, the risk remains on the seller until ''receipf' by the buyer. ''Receipf' requires 
"physical possession" of the goods. See id. § 2-103{l)(c). 
236. The official comments following section 2-509 explain: 
The underlying theory of [the merchant rule of section 2-509(3)] is that a 
merchant who is to make physical delivery at his own place continues meanwhile 
to control the goods and can be expected to insure his interest in them. The buyer, 
on the other hand, has no control of the goods and it is extremely unlikely that he 
will carry insurance on goods not yet in his possession. 
Id. § 2-509 cmt 3. 
237. See Diefenbach v. Gomey, 234 N.E.2d 813, 813-14 {Ill. App. Ct 1968). Whether 
the application of section 2-509(3) would have been outcome determinative would depend 
upon whether the seller was a "merchant" Section 2-104(1) defines merchant to mean: 
[A] person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds 
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods 
involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attnouted 
by his employment of an agent or broker or other intennediary who by his 
occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill. 
U.C.C. § 2~104(1) (1998). The question of whether a farmer is a merchant in the context of 
various Code provisions has haunted courts and commentators alike. Although the issue 
usually arises and is discussed in the context of the statute of frauds, what a court would 
decide in a risk ofloss situation when the "[f]armer appears in court outfitted in bib overalls 
and cowboy boots that cast off a faint perfume of manure," is anyone's guess. Ingrid 
Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn s Attempt to Achieve the 
Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1176-78 (1985). 
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one Code section that the court did discuss merely codified a 
longstanding common-law rule.238 
How does one explain the court's faulty reasoning and its 
selective application of Code sections? Perhaps the court took over a 
century of intellectual tradition and learning into account, implicitly if 
not explicitly. This would account for the theme of nonreform in an 
opinion grounded in the past. There is, indeed, good reason to believe 
that Diefenbach is additional evidence that the independent claim of 
taught law, and the problems it poses for the judicial enterprise, cannot 
be so easily overcome. 
It is always possible to spot failures by courts to apply the law 
correctly if one looks hard enough and measures "failure" against 
some normative standard of how cases should be decided. Indeed, it is 
child's play to show that, when applying statutes, courts do not always 
reach the results the drafters intended. But judicial decision making, 
like any complex decision-making process, remains difficult to 
explain. The idea that a judge's legal perspective is partially a 
background of legal training and experience seems most compelling 
with respect to cases decided soon after legal rules change. We have 
seen that habits of thought may limit the effectiveness of the change 
until new habits have had time to develop. Eventually, however, 
legislative changes will be able to exert a meaningful influence on 
even the most intellectually stubborn of judges. With this account of 
the role that taught law plays in the decision-making process, together 
with how intellectual habits are mediated by legal change, we can now 
try to predict some of the effects that the CISG may have on the future 
course of domestic law. 
ill. THE RELEVANCE OF THE CISG TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
DOMESTIC LAW 
The potential influence that the CISG might have on courts 
cannot be fully understood apart from the role that decisional law 
plays in the broader scheme of lawmaking. In their classic treatise on 
the legal process, Professors Hart and Sacks raise the issues that would 
have to be addressed: 
How should courts conceive of their responsibility to keep this body of 
[unwritten] law alive and growing? When can they properly say, ''the 
decisional law is settled, and any new development or change must 
238. According to the court, UCC section 2-328(3) continues the rule that an "auction 
sale is complete when the property is knocked down to the bidder." Diefenbach, 234 N.E.2d 
at 814. 
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come from the legislature"? When are they obliged to say this? When, 
on the other hand, do they abdicate responsibility if they do so?239 
This Part does not purport to present a complete :functional analysis of 
these issues. In particular, it is assumed that, once understood, there 
will be general agreement that it would be appropriate for courts to 
adjust the development of decisional law in reaction to the CISG in 
certain respects. In addition, this Part takes no position on whether 
these adjustments would be based on normatively persuasive 
conceptions of"good" or ''better'' law. The discussion is confined to a 
sampling of instances where continued application of the CISG might, 
over time, modify present law by causing the formation of new habits 
of judicial decision making. 
More specifically, subpart A considers the extent to which the · 
CISG might encourage courts to expand the availability of specific 
relie£ Subpart B discusses the seller's right of reclamation and the 
possibility that courts might rationally choose to enlarge its scope. 
Subpart C explains why it might be desirable to make the German 
procedure of Nachfrist a part of domestic law. 
A. The Expanded Availability of Specific Relief 
Few premises are recited so frequently, and so reflexively, as 
"specific performance is an extraordinary remedy developed . . . to 
provide relief when the· legal remedies of damages and restitution are 
inadequate."240 This rule has its genesis in the centuries-old 
jurisdictional conflict between the English common-law courts and the 
courts of equity. The compromise that they eventually reached was 
that the courts of equity would step in and assume jurisdiction only in 
those cases where the aggrieved party could show that irreparable 
injury would result if equitable relief were refused. For buyers of 
goods, this meant that specific performance became the exception 
rather than the rule.241 To see why this was so, one need only 
understand that a central assumption of this jurisdictional division was 
the homogeneity of goods. If the seller does not deliver the goods, the 
239. HENRY M. HAR:r, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 341 (William N. Eslaidge, Jr. & Philip 
P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958). 
240. CALAMARI&PERILLO, supra note 165, § 16-1, at 661. 
241. Because specific performance in favor of sellers raises special concerns, this 
discussion is limited to the buyer's right to specific performance. One particular concern 
follows from the fact that the only difference between specific performance for the seller and 
an action for the price (damages), see U.C.C. § 2-709 (1998), is that enforcement of the 
former is by contempt For some, this may conjure up unacceptable visions of a debtor's 
prison. 
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buyer will, most often, be able to obtain similar goods elsewhere. As a 
result, the buyer's expectation interest is fully vindicated by a damage 
award based on an imagined242 or actual substitute purchase.243 There 
were, however, situations, sufficiently out of the ordinary, in which 
protection of the buyer's expectation demanded that the remedy be the 
right to obtain possession of the goods from the seller. Thus, where 
the goods were unique or not otherwise readily available in the 
marketplace, specific performance was granted.244 
The outlines of specific performance remained unchanged until 
1855 when the British Mercantile Law Commission was established to 
reconcile the civil-law rules of Scotland and the common-law rules 
found in the other countries comprising the United Kingdom.245 One 
question the commission had to answer was whether it should 
recommend ''the limited view of specific relief traditional to the 
common law or the broad remedy of 'specific implement' under 
Scotch civil."246 The Commission recommended the latter. 
''We see no reason why a buyer of goods should not be entitled to 
compel the seller to perform specifically his obligation to deliver them 
in terms of the contract. . . . We recommend that on this subject the 
laws of England and Ireland be assimilated to the law of Scotland."247 
242. For example, one Code fonnula for measuring the buyer's damages is the 
difference between the market price at the time the buyer learned of the breach and the 
contract price. See U.C.C. § 2-713 (1998). The import of this remedy is that a market exists, 
giving the buyer the opportunity to enter into substitute transactions. If the buyer is forced to 
pay more than the contract price, the excess is recoverable from the seller. While in theory 
this calculation should put the buyer in the position he would have occupied had the seller 
perfonned, in practice it may not See Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts 
Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article 
Two, 73 YALEL.J. 199, 258-60 (1963). 
243. A measure of damages more accurate than the speculative market price/contract 
price fonnula is a calculation based on an actual substitute purchase. For example, UCC 
section 2-712 pennits a buyer to "cover'' by buying elsewhere and to recover from the seller 
the difference between the cover price and the contract price. See U.C.C. § 2-712 (1998). 
244. No one would doubt that a careful study of pre-Code cases would yield 
uniqueness as a major explanatory principle. See D.A. Norris, Annotation, Specific 
Peiformance, or Injunction Against Breach, of Contract for Sale of Tangible Personal 
Property, 152 A.L.R. 4, 22-25 (1944). '"The tenn 'unique' was used generally in the context 
of heirlooms, works of art, antiques, or goods having a pretium affectionis-a special value 
not measurable in dollars." Harold Greenberg, Specific Peiformance Under Section 2-716 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code: "A More Liberal Attitude" in the "Grand Style", 17 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 321, 324 (1982). 
245. See 1955 NEW YORK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 207, at 575. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Second Report Mercantile Law Comm'n, 354 
PARL. PAPERS 10 (King & Son 1855)). 
1999] INERTIA OF HABIT 543 
The very next year this recommendation found its way into the 
English Sale of Goods Act.248 By itself, the expansion of specific 
performance in Great Britain probably would not have compelled 
courts in the United States to liberalize the granting of the remedy. 
However, the liberalization movement abroad profoundly influenced 
Professor Williston when he sat down to draft the Uniform Sales Act. 
With only a few minor variations, he copied section 68 directly from 
section 52 of the British Sale of Goods Act.249 It read in part: 
Where the seller bas broken a contract to deliver specific or ascertained 
goods, a court having the powers of a court of equity may, if it thinks 
fit, on the application of the buyer, by its judgment or decree direct that 
the contract shall be perfonned specifically, without giving the seller 
the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages.250 
Although this provision invited courts to reform specific performance 
practice by expanding the number of cases in which the remedy would 
be available, the invitation was refused. Courts continued to do what 
they did before the Uniform Sales Act.251 This is not smprising; as 
Part II of this Article has shown, legal tradition and training can 
sometimes undercut statutory changes. The legal community had been 
so well indoctrinated to search solely for uniqueness that even the 
revolutionary language of the Uniform Sales Act fell on deaf ears. 
The Code, not smprisingly, reserves specific performance for 
those cases ''where the goods are unique or in other proper 
circumstances."252 Ironically, however, this seemingly traditional 
statement belies the drafters' true intent, which they inexplicably 
decided to express in the comments. The drafters, apparently hoping 
248. See Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Viet, ch. 71, § 52 (Eng.). Section 52 of 
the Act provided: 
Id. 
In any action for breach of contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods 
the court may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the plaintiff, by its judgment or 
decree direct that the contract shall be perfonned specifically, without giving the 
defendant the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages. 
249. See UNIF. SALES ACT§ 68 (1906), 3B U.L.A. 501 (1992). 
250. Id. Williston hoped that section 68 would ''perhaps dispose courts to enlarge 
somewhat the number of cases where specific perfonnance is allowed." 2 SAMUEL 
WIWSI"ON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT CoMMON LAW AND UNDER THE 
UNIFORM SALES ACT§ 601, at 1508 (2d ed. 1924). 
251. Williston himself commented that the English Sale of Goods Act and section 68 
had not been ''much relied on by the courts ... but they seem to afford a clear warrant for an 
extension of previously existing rules." 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CoN1RACTS 
§ 1419a, at 2525 n.37 (1920); see also 1955 NEW YORK CoMMJSSION REPORT, supra note 
207, at 575 ("[D]ecisions have construed this language against a background of equity 
practice to require a showing that the remedy at law be inadequate."). 
252. u.c.c. § 2-716(1) (1998). 
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to foster a liberalization of the remedy,253 offer in the comments an 
expanded definition of uniqueness that takes into account ''the total 
situation which characterizes the contract."254 fu addition, "relief may 
also be granted 'in other proper circumstances' and inability to cover is 
strong evidence of' other proper circumstances' ."255 
While some commentators have noted an expansive post-Code 
trend toward the granting of specific performance,256 the majority of 
courts continue to couch their opinions in the traditional orthodoxy of 
uniqueness or peculiarity.257 The fact remains, however, that those 
courts which are now inclined to alter their traditional position on 
specific performance are free to do so under the rubric "other proper 
circumstances."258 But as the history above indicates, the influence of 
traditional limits on this powerful remedy is formidable, and the 
habitual patterns it has caused may be difficult to break. It may be that 
those courts which remain reluctant to grant specific performance 
except as an extraordinary remedy will continue to decide cases along 
historical lines until the next event occurs in the evolutionary process 
of liberalization. We can only speculate, but perhaps the next event 
has already occurred. 259 
253. See id. § 2-716 cmt 1 ("[T]his Article seeks to further a more liberal attitude than 
some courts have shoWI1 in connection with the specific performance of contracts of sale."). 
254. Id. § 2-716 cmt 2. 
255. Id. It should also be noted that the drafters dropped the Uniform Sales Act 
requirement that the goods be specific or ascertained. 
256. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 244, at 344 ("Examination of the cases decided 
since enactment of the Code in the various states reveals a continuing evolutionary trend 
toward liberalization of the availability of specific performance."). 
257. For decisions denying specific performance, see Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d 
1247, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1977) (cotton was not unique); Abbott v. Blackwelder Furniture Co., 
33 B.R. 399, 404 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (furniture was not unique); and Pierce-Odom, Inc. v. 
Evenson, 632 S.W.2d 247, 248-49 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (mobile home was not unique). For 
decisions granting specific performance, see Fast v. Southern Offshore Yachts, 587 F. Supp. 
1354, 1357 (D. Conn. 1984) (yacht was unique); Gay v. Seafarer Fiberglass Yachts, Inc., 14 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1335, 1335-38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1974) (same); Stephan's Mach. & Tool, Inc. 
v. D & H Mach. Consultants, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 579, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (machine was 
unique); Belleville v. Davis, 498 P.2d 744, 748 (Or. 1972) (en bane) (one-half interest in taxi 
was unique); and Madariaga v. Morris, 639 S.W.2d 709, 712-13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) 
(Albert's Famous Mexican Hot Sauce was unique). 
258. See, e.g., In re Bullet Jet Charter Inc., 177 B.R. 593, 599 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 1995); 
King Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Lane, 846 P.2d 550, 556-57 (Wash. Ct App. 1993). 
259. Another liberalizing event may be in the offing. Revised article 2 may contain a 
provision declaring that courts may enforce a clause in a contract providing for specific 
performance. See U.C.C. § 2-716(a) (Interim Draft Nov. 1999). Considering the lack of 
litigation that these clauses have engendered over the years (counting both Code and non-
Code cases), one has to assume that they rarely find their way into contracts. One can 
speculate that such a clause, despite being potentially advantageous to both parties, is rarely 
used because courts by and large do not feel that the use of such clauses dispenses with the 
need to establish the traditional prerequisites for specific relief. See, e.g., Snell v. Mitchell, 
1999] INERTIA OF HABIT 545 
Consistent with the civil-law notion that specific performance is 
the aggrieved party's entitlement, article 46 of the CISG gi-ants the 
disappointed buyer a broad right to compel the seller's performance as 
originally agreed. If the seller has not delivered the goods, the buyer is 
entitled to this remedy provided she has not resorted to a remedy 
inconsistent with an action to compel performance.260 
There is, however, one major stumbling block facing a buyer 
who happens to file suit in the United States. The common law/civil 
law compromise found in article 28 allows the court to refrain from 
ordering performance if it would not do so under its own domestic 
law.261 The outcome may, therefore, ultimately depend on the choice 
of forum. In the United States, for example, a court might withhold 
the remedy in any case in which the buyer could readily purchase 
replacement goods elsewhere. 262 But it is important to understand that 
while article 28 would not mandate specific performance in such a 
situation, neither would it necessarily preclude it. A United States 
court could presumably rely on article 7 and conclude that domestic 
65 Me. 48, 50 (1876) ("Neither party to a contract can insist, as a matter of right, upon a 
decree for its specific performance."); Manchester Dairy Sys., Inc. v. Hayward, 132 A. 12, 15 
(N.H. 1926) ("[A]uthority, if any here, is to be found, not in the express stipulations for 
equitable relief, but in the general principles limiting equitable jurisdiction."); see also 
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNrRACTS § 359 cmt (1981) ("Because the availability of 
equitable relief was historically viewed as a matter of jurisdiction, the parties cannot vary by 
agreement the requirement of inadequacy of damages, although a court may take appropriate 
notice of facts recited in their contract"). In sum, the revision to article 2 would work a 
revolution in theory. 
260. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 46(1). "The buyer may require performance by the 
seller of his obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with 
this requirement" Id. It seems clear that a declaration by the buyer' that the contract is 
avoided under article 49 is inconsistent with compelling delivery of the goods as contracted, 
whereas a claim for damages is not. See id. art 45(2) ("The buyer is not deprived of any 
right he may have to claim damages by exercising his right to other remedies."). 
If the seller has delivered nonconforming goods, efficiency concerns justify a somewhat 
less liberal application of the specific performance remedy. Additional limitations on the 
remedy are, therefore, found in article 46, subsections (2) and (3). Under subsection (2), the 
buyer can demand substitute goods only if the nonconformity constitutes a fundamental 
breach, and she may not demand that the seller repair the defect under subsection (3) if it 
would be unreasonable in the circumstances. See id. art 46. In the event the buyer elects to 
require the seller to deliver substitute goods, she is, of course, obligated to make restitution of 
the unsatisfactory goods "substantially in the condition in which he received them." Id. art. 
82(1). 
Id. 
261. See id. art. 28. Article 28 provides: 
If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is entitled 
to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to 
enter a judgement for specific performance unless the court would do so under its 
own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention. 
262. See U.C.C. § 2-716 (1998). 
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restrictions on specific performance should be loosened in the context 
of CISG cases.263 
What pertinence has this to the availability of specific 
performance in purely domestic cases? It just may be that the 
remedial scheme under the CISG will eventually have the effect of 
changing the remedy of specific performance from a limited remedy to 
a remedy more widely available. The process is dynamic in that 
courts are likely to encounter more requests for the remedy as CISG 
cases begin to proliferate.264 In tum, courts that favor expansion of the 
remedy are likely to disregard domestic limitations, which they are 
certainly free to do under article 28. In making these decisions, a new 
remedial jurisprudence will slowly develop, and old habits of restraint 
will be broken. Since the Code's "other proper circumstances" 
language can be used to support a great deal of judicial discretion, 
there would be no real statutory impediment to this change of attitude. 
In this manner, section 2-716 can truly have the liberalizing effect that 
Llewellyn and his drafting team intended.265 
263. In an effort to achieve international unifonnity, the drafters of article 7 caution 
courts against a parochial application of the Convention. "In the interpretation of this 
Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote 
unifonnity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade." CISG, 
supra note 18, art. 7(1). See generally Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the C/SG in 
a Decentralized System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges 
to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & CoM. 187 (1998) (exploring the 
difficulties caused by the several different language versions of the CISG). 
264. For two explanations of why there have been so few domestic cases decided 
under the CISG and why that situation is not likely to continue, see V. Susanne Cook, C/SG: 
From the Perspective of the Practitioner, 17 J.L. & CoM. 343, 349-53 (1998), and John E. 
Murray, Jr., The Neglect of CJSG: A Workable Solution, 17 J.L. & COM. 365, 365-79 (1998). 
It is not suggested here that specific performance will be the remedy of choice for most 
disappointed buyers under the CISG. On the contrary, it would most often be more efficient 
for a buyer who is able to procure substitute goods from some other party to do so and 
recover any additional costs as damages. Although specific performance may never become 
the natural remedy in the run-of-the-mill case, it seems reasonable to assume that, in the 
aggregate, there will be considerably more requests for specific performance when the CISG 
governs. 
265. Consider, for example, the plight of the prepaying buyer who discovers that the 
breaching seller is insolvent. Is such a buyer entitled to specific performance? Today, there 
is case law that would support the availability of specific performance in such cases, see, e.g., 
Proyectos Electronicos, S.A. v. Alper, 37 B.R. 931, 933 (E.D. Pa 1983), but not all courts, 
see, e.g., Abbott v. Blackwelder Furniture Co., 33 B.R. 399, 404 (W.D.N.C. 1983), and 
commentators, see, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Advance Payments in Contracts for Sale of 
Manufactured Goods: A Look at the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CAL. L. REY. 281, 286-
87 (1964) (seeing little support for this theory in view of section 2-716's emphasis on 
feasibility of replacement rather than commitment by the buyer), would agree. If the new 
article 2 takes effect, this issue will no longer be of any real importance where consumer 
goods have been identified to the contract. See U.C.C. § 2-502 (Interim Draft Nov. 1999) 
(providing that a prepaying buyer has the right to recover consumer goods in which he has a 
special property). It will, however, remain an issue of critical importance in consumer 
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B. An Expanded Right of Reclamation 
Any extended discussion of article 2 invariably will touch on the 
subject of the buyer's insolvency.266 This is the case because even the 
most scrupulous buyer will find it difficult to perform when insolvent, 
and the seller likely will find that damages are not an adequate remedy. 
This raises an important policy issue: what 8pecial rights, if any, 
should be afforded the seller when the buyer's insolvency intervenes? 
Historically, the seller was permitted to rescind the contract and 
reclaim the goods if the delivery had been induced by the buyer's 
:fraudulent misrepresentation of solvency or intention to pay.267 
Indeed, some courts were even willing to infer fraud from the mere 
fact that the buyer was hopelessly insolvent at the time she took 
delivery in a credit transaction.268 In this situation, section 2-702 
provides the modem reclamation remedy for credit sellers:269 
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods 
on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made 
Within ten days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency 
has been made to the particular seller in writing within three months 
before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply. Except as 
provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim 
goods on the buyer's :fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of 
solvency or of intent to pay. 
situations when the goods have not yet been appropriated to the contract or acquired by the 
seller and in nonconsumer sales. This is, therefore, one context in which buyers might 
benefit from a new judicial attitude toward specific performance. 
266. Under the Code, "[a] person is 'insolvent' who either has ceased to pay his debts 
in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent 
within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (1998). 
267. See Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information, and Trust in the Law of Sales: The 
Credit Sellers Right of Reclamation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 247, 254-61 (1996). 
268. See id. at 259. 
269. Apart from an explicit reclamation remedy for credit sellers, the Code also 
contains an implicit reclamation remedy for the so-called cash seller. See generally 
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNJFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE, PEB CoMMENTARY 
No. 1: SECITON 2-507(2), in 3B U.L.A. 602, 602-05 (1992). This reclamation remedy may 
be needed when, for example, the buyer gives the seller a check which is later dishonored 
upon presentation. The remedy is said to be grounded in two sections. The first is section 2-
507, which provides, ''Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of 
goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is 
conditional upon his making the payment due." U.C.C. § 2-507(2) (1998). The second 
section is 2-511. This section provides that "payment by check is conditional and is defeated 
as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment." Id. § 2-511(3). The 
discussion in the text, while focused specifically on the credit seller's reclamation remedy 
under section 2-702, is equally applicable to the unpaid cash seller's reclamation remedy. For 
purposes of this Article, both remedies raise identical issues of scope and the potential affect 
of the CISG on each is similar. 
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(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to 
the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser 
under this Article (Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods 
excludes all other remedies with respect to them.270 
New here is the explicit statutory recognition that the credit seller 
deserves some special protection even if granting that protection 
means she is being preferred over the seller's other creditors.271 And 
what flows from this recognition? Upon reading the section, one 
cannot help but notice that the remedy it grants is subject to procedural 
and substantive limitations that put it beyond the grasp of most sellers 
who may wish to use it.272 Moreover, most courts have placed an 
additional limitation on reclamation claims by requiring the seller to 
identify the goods she wishes to reclaim as those delivered under the 
contract.273 Their reasoning is statutory and not particularly 
convincing-the reference in section 2-702(2) to ''the goods" must 
mean the "goods" first mentioned in the subsection (i.e., the goods 
actually received by the buyer).274 
One consequence of this restrictive reading of section 2-702 is 
that the seller is out of luck if the original goods have been 
270. u.c.c. § 2-702(2)-(3) (1998). 
271. There was no section in the Uniform Sales Act that addressed reclamation 
directly. However, it did so indirectly in section 73 by preserving rules relating to fraud and 
misrepresentation. See UNIF. SALES ACT § 73 (1906), 3B U.L.A. 503 (1992). Courts 
understood this to mean that the pre-Act law of reclamation continued to apply. See Garvin, 
supra note 267, at 262. Notice that section 2-702 does not require proof of fraud or 
misrepresentation. It "takes as its base line the proposition that any receipt of goods on credit 
by an insolvent buyer amounts to a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency and therefore 
is fraudulent as against the particular seller." U.C.C. § 2-702 cmt 2. Moreover, comment 3 
leaves little doubt that reclamation "constitutes preferential treatment as against the buyer's 
other creditors." Id. cmt 3. 
272. See U.C.C. § 2-702. One author describes the chances of being able to clear the 
technical hurdles of section 2-702 as "mission impossible." See Brian N. Siegal, 
Reclamation from an Insolvent Vendee-Mission Impossible?, 9 UCC L.J. 27, 43 (1976). It 
is not just compliance with the technical requirements of the section that the seller has to 
worry about; she must also be concerned about her priority vis-a-vis third parties who also 
claim an interest in the goods. The list of possible third-party claimants includes a purchaser 
from the buyer, a secured creditor of the buyer, a judgment creditor of the buyer, and the 
buyer's trustee in bankruptcy. This Article is not concerned with these priority conflicts; 
rather, its only concern is whether the seller has a reclamation right as against the buyer. 
Without such a right, third-party claims are irrelevant. 
273. See, e.g., In re Mayer Pollock Steel Corp., 157 B.R. 952, 959 (Bankr. E.D. Pa 
1993); In re Dynamic Techs. Corp., 106 B.R. 994, 1004 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989); Jn re 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 74 B.R. 656, 658 (Bankr. W.D. Pa 1987). 
274. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 74 B.R. at 659. It is difficult to believe that the 
statutory language is what dictates such a limitation when courts have reached the same 
conclusion with regard to the scope of the remedy available to reclaiming cash sellers. See, 
e.g., Jn re Samuels& Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane). 
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transformed into goods of a different kind.275 As one commentator so 
elegantly put it, "[a] seller of cattle may not reclaim rump roast."276 
Notwithstanding the reason courts give for not permitting reclamation 
in these cases, the age-old property law doctrine of specification may 
be the key to understanding their reluctance. Specification occurs 
when a new article (a "nova species'') is made out of one person's 
chattel through the skill and labor of another, as when A's leather is 
made into shoes by B, or X's grapes are made into wine by Y.277 If the 
specificator has succeeded in creating a new species of good, the 
original owner's interest terminates; if not, the owner of the original 
good retains title to the end product.278 Although the doctrine is easily 
stated, its application often requires the skills of a metaphysician, for 
the determination of whether a certain chemical transformation or 
physical change has been sufficient to shift title to the specificator is 
fact-specific and inherently subjective.279 Whatever its difficulties, the 
275. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 74 B.R. at 658. Another consequence of even 
more significance is that the seller has no rights to the identifiable proceeds of the sale of 
those goods. See, e.g., In re Coast Trading Co., 744 F.2d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1984); Samuels, 
526 F.2d at 1245; In re Diversified Food Serv. Distribs., Inc., 130 B.R. 427, 430 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Buyer's Club Mkts., Inc., 100 B.R. 37, 38 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); In re 
Landy Beef Co., 30 B.R. 19, 21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983). Essentially, what this means for the 
seller is that the reclamation remedy is valueless if the goods have been sold to a buyer in 
ordinary course or there is a secured party who has an interest in the goods as after-acquired 
collateral. To give the reclaiming seller a modicum of protection, one court allowed the seller 
to recover the proceeds remaining after the claim of the priority secured party had been 
satisfied. See United States v. Westside Bank, 732 F.2d 1258, 1263-65 (5th Cir. 1984). An 
additional difficulty not present in cases where the goods have been transformed complicates 
the question of whether the CISG is likely to have any effect on how courts treat proceeds 
claims. See infra text accompanying note 294. 
276. Garvin, supra note 267, at 276; see also Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 74 B.R. at 659-60 
(holding a seller of coal is not permitted to reclaim coke); Landy Beef Co., 30 B.R. at 21 
(holding a seller of calves is not permitted to recover beet). 
277. See RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPEIITY § 6.2, at 50-51 
(Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975). A related but conceptually distinct doctrine is that 
of accession. Accession occurs when a lesser good, the accession, is united with a principal 
good. As a result of this integration, title to the accession passes to the owner of the principal 
good. See id. § 6.1, at 49-50. An important similarity between the specification and 
accession doctrines is that both operate only when the end product cannot be divided. It is 
for this reason that one party must receive title to the whole product This all-or-nothing 
approach is a consequence of the fact that "[t]he policy of the law favors absolute ownership 
in one when a partition is impossible, rather than a tenancy in common of undivided shares." 
Kenneth B. Lane, Note, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 119, 123 (1936). Although the accession doctrine 
may also influence courts in the application of section 2-702, the discussion in the text is 
limited to specification because the reported cases are overwhelmingly specification-type 
cases. 
278. See BROWN, supra note 277, § 6.2, at 50-51. 
279. Compare Riddle v. Driver, 12 Ala 590, 591-92 (1847) (wood transformed into 
charcoal is the same species of good), Eaton v. Langley, 47 S.W. 123, 125-26 (Ark. 1898) 
(timber transformed into cross ties is the same species of good), and Burris v. Johnson, 24 
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point is that the doctrine is an all-or-nothing approach to title-one 
party receives title to the whole good. 
Pre-Code disputes involving secured parties may help to 
illuminate how a court might, today, be influenced by the doctrine of 
specification when applying section 2-702. It would seem that the 
doctrine would be relevant in a wide variety of cases where work is 
performed on collateral-for example, the manufacturing of an item 
from materials subject to a lien. In such a situation, the question of 
whether the secured party's interest will continue in the new product 
and embrace the increased value derived from the labor of the debtor 
would seem to require a specification analysis. Although not 
explicitly using the term "specification," a number of courts faced with 
such situations have used language indicating the need for the same 
type of nova species inquiry used in specification cases not involving 
liens.28° For example, the court in Netzog v. National Supply Co. 
observed: 
It is not to be doubted that a mortgage placed upon some one article, 
will cover that article as subsequently changed, provided the integrity of 
the article remains. Precisely as with a mortgage on a house and lot, 
where the mortgage will remain a lien upon the house although painted 
and improved durinfil the time of the existence of the mortgage and 
before it foreclosed.2 1 
Today, of course, courts would approach the matter differently in the 
context of article 9 where there is a manifested intention to change old 
habits.282 But because there is nothing in article 2 that would cause a 
court to think differently about the doctrine of specification when a 
seller seeks to reclaim, old habits remain unbroken.283 
Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh) 196, 197-98 (1829) (timber transformed into a boat frame is the same 
species of good), with Lampton's Ex'rs v. Preston's Ex'rs, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh) 454, 467 
(1829) (clay transformed into fired brick is a new species of good), and Potter v. Manire, 74 
N.C. 36, 42 (1876) (timber transformed into a canoe is a new species of good). 
280. See, e.g., Comins v. Newton, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 518, 518 (1865); Crosby v. 
Baker, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 295, 298 (1863); Harding v. Coburn, 53 Mass. (12 Met) 333, 342-
43 (1847). 
281. 28 Ohio C.C. Dec. 112 (1905). 
282. See U.C.C. § 9-315 (1998). 
This section changes the law in some jurisdictions where a security interest 
in goods (e.g., raw materials) was lost when the goods lost their identity by being 
commingled or processed. Under this section the security interest continues in the 
resulting mass or product. ... 
Id. § 9-315 cmt 2. 
283. Not mentioned thus far is the problem of commingled goods. Specifically, is the 
right to reclaim extinguished if the seller delivers fungible goods that are subsequently 
commingled with similar goods from other sources in an identifiable mass? Most courts 
have answered ''no" and have permitted the seller to reclaim a pro rata portion of the mass. 
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Unlike the Code, the CISG does not specifically address the 
seller's right to reclaim goods from the buyer. But this does not mean 
that the right does not exist. Rather, it leaves the ability to reclaim, if 
any, to be achieved through the catalogue of remedies provided for the 
unpaid seller. The first step on the road to reclamation is for the seller 
to declare the contract avoided under article 64(1).284 This she may do 
if the buyer's breach is fundamental,285 or if the seller has provided 
additional time for the buyer to pay or perform its other obligations 
under article 63 (a Nachfrist notice), and the buyer did not do so within 
that extra period, or the buyer otherwise notified the seller of her 
intention not to comply.286 Once the contract has been avoided, the 
seller will always have a right to restitution of the goods under article 
81(2).287 Moreover, where the buyer has not paid the price, there are 
no legal restrictions on the seller avoiding the contract even after the 
buyer has held the goods for a substantial time.288 This alone 
represents a significant departure from the remedial rights granted 
unpaid sellers under the Code,289 but there is more. Article 84 
supplements the seller's right of restitution by requiring that the buyer 
"account to the seller for all benefits which he has derived from the 
goods."290 Arguably, this permits the seller to extend the in rem right 
See, e.g., In re Braniff, Inc., 113 B.R. 745, 753-54 (Bankr. M.D. Fla 1990); In re Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 74 B.R. 656, 660-61 (Bankr. W.D. Pa 1987); In re Charter Co., 54 
B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. M.D. Fla 1985). This is in keeping with pre-Code law. See, e.g., Clark 
v. William Munroe Co., 86 N.W. 816, 817 (Mich. 1901). Moreover, article 2 explicitly 
sanctions the sale of fungible goods. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201 (17), 2-105( 4), 2-3 l 4(2)(b) (1998). 
284. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 64(1 ). 
285. See id. art. 64(l)(a). The important concept of fundamental breach is defined in 
article 25. See supra note 90. 
. 286. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 63. Essentially, the Nachfrist procedure enables the 
aggrieved party to make the other party's failure to perfonn by a particular date the 
equivalent of a fundamental breach. If failure to pay the purchase price when due is not itself 
sufficient to create a fundamental breach, using a Nachfrist notice can make it so. For further 
discussion of Nachfrist, see discussion infra Part III.C. 
287. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 81(2) ("A party who has perfonned the contract 
either wholly or in part may claim restitution from the other party of whatever the first party 
has supplied or paid under the contract If both parties are bound to make restitution, they 
must do so concurrently."). Again, it should be emphasized that this Article is concerned 
only with the buyer/seller relationship. Because the CISG governs only the rights of parties 
to the sales agreement, see id. art. 4, local law may defeat the seller's right to claim restitution 
of the goods when certain third parties are involved. 
288. A paid seller forfeits the right to avoid the contract unless she complies with the 
specified time limits. See id. art. 64(2). 
289. Professor John Honnold, who is unquestionably the leading commentator on the 
CISG, observes that article 81(2) ''has implications that may be surprising to those schooled 
in the common law." JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR lNTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER 
nm 1980 UNITED NATIONS CoNVENTION § 444, at 562 (2d ed. 1991). 
290. CISG, supra note 18, art. 84(2). 
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of restitution into the proceeds resulting from the sale or other 
disposition of the original goods or the product resulting from its 
processing.291 In short, the seller's right of avoidance under the CISG 
produces a right of reclamation which is substantially broader and 
more potent than its UCC counterpart. 
There is no question that the :frequent application of the CISG can 
change how courts read particular UCC provisions such as section 2-
702. Under the current version of the Code, the CISG holds out the 
promise of encouraging courts to permit reclamation in various 
situations not covered by 2-702 and reclamation of proceeds and 
products.292 If and when revised article 2 takes effect, there may be 
one complicating factor. In an earlier draft, the unofficial comments 
following section 2-816 contain this statement: ''The right to reclaim 
extends only to the goods involved and does not extend to any 
291. To the extent that the buyer has created additional value by marketing the goods 
or by using its equipment and labor to transform the goods, however, some adjustment might 
be necessary. See HONNOLD, supra note 289, § 451.3, at 573 n.5 ("Presumably, the buyer 
could deduct the cost of redisposition; a similar adjustment would be appropriate when the 
goods have been processed.''); see also In re Performance Papers, Inc., 119 B.R. 127, 128-30 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that proceeds from the sale of goods by authorization of 
bankruptcy court in excess of seller's invoice price go to the bankruptcy estate). 
Article 84(2) may also impel courts in non-CISG cases to more freely permit plaintiffs 
to recover damages measured by the gain realized by the party in breach rather than the 
plaintiff's lost expectation. Professor Farnsworth offers the following example: 
Suppose that you and I have made a contract under which I am to sell you a 
widget for $100, cash on delivery. At the time we made the contract, I valued the 
widget at $90 and you valued it at $110, so the contract seemed advantageous to 
both of us. But instead of delivering the widget to you, I found another buyer 
willing to pay $125 and sold it to that buyer, realizing $25 over our contract price. 
Since you still valued the widget at $110, I offered you $10 out of that $25. Can 
you recover $25 from me? 
Since, according to conventional wisdom, my "mere" breach of contract is 
not a ''wrong," you can recover only $10 and not $25. The $10 that I offered you 
would put you in as good a position as you would have been in had the contract 
been performed, since that amount, plus the $100 you have not paid me, equals the 
value of the widget to you. 
E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in 
Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1341-42 (1985) (footnote omitted). 
292. Although section 2-702 provides the only route to reclamation for the buyer's 
misrepresentations of solvency or of intent to pay, see U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1998), the Code is 
silent on whether the seller can reclaim for other reasons based on the common law of the 
state. At least one court has suggested that she can. See In re Metal Tech. Mfg., Inc., 27 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 701, 705 (D. Utah 1979). But see ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 165, at 498-500 (1970) (suggesting that the Code is the 
exclusive source of remedies for sellers). Section 1-103 of the Code permits the application 
of non-Code rules in a Code-covered case unless those rules have been supplanted by the 
Code. Of course, the tricky question is whether the Code has supplanted the common-law or 
equitable rule. For a critical discussion of the various tests used by courts and suggested by 
commentators to answer this question, see Frisch, supra note 54. 
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proceeds of the goods."293 Assuming that this statement will be part of 
the official comments, a court might have to break the habit of 
following the comments before it can break the habit of not 
recognizing a reclamation right to proceeds.294 
C. The Nachfrist Procedure 
The final example of how the CISG might affect the 
development of domestic law is rather different from those employed 
above. Here, the focus is not so much on how application of the 
Convention might cause courts to reverse prior decisions, but, rather, 
on the possibility that particular CISG rules might give birth to new 
principles.295 
We have already seen that the article 25 definition of 
":fundamental breach" is applicable to both buyers and sellers and is 
one of the key concepts on which the remedial structure of the CISG is 
built.296 In particular, the concept triggers the aggrieved party's right to 
avoid the contract.297 Suppose that the seller or buyer fails to perform 
293. U.C.C. § 2-816(b) cmt 5(ProposedFinalDraftMay1, 1999). 
294. Interestingly, several commentators, including this author, have recently argued 
that the former habit should be broken. See, e.g., Peter A. Akes & David Frisch, 
Commenting on "Purpose" in the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Omo ST. L.J. 419, 458 
(1997) ("[11he comments are produced by a system that behaves quite differently from what 
is widely assumed.''); Laurens Walker, Writings on the Margin of American Law: Committee 
Notes, Comments, and Commentary, 29 GA. L. REv. 993, 1007-15 (1995) (depicting the 
comments as the product of special interest groups and arguing that, as such, they are not 
worthy of judicial deference). 
295. Other legal systems have long played an important role in the development of the 
common law. Discussing the judge as legislator, Justice Cardozo noted: 
Many of the gaps have been filled in the development of the common law 
by borrowing from other systems. Whole titles in our jurisprudence have been 
taken from the law of Rome. Some of the greatest of our judges-Mansfield in 
England, Kent and Story here-were never weary of supporting their judgments 
by citations from the Digest We should be traveling too far afield if we were to 
attempt an estimate of the extent to which the law of Rome has modified the 
common law either in England or with us. Authority it never had. The great 
historic movement of the Reception did not touch the British Isles. Analogies have 
been supplied. Lines of thought have been suggested. Wise solutions have been 
offered for problems otherwise insoluble. None the less, the function of the 
foreign system has been to advise rather than to command. It has not furnished a 
new method. It has given the raw material to be utilized by methods already 
considered-the methods of philosophy and history and sociology-in the 
moulding of their products. It is only one compartment in the great reservoir of 
social experience and truth and wisdom from which the judges of the common law 
must draw their inspiration and their knowledge. 
CARDOZO, supra note 123, at 123-24 (footnotes omitted). 
296. See supra text accompanying notes 89-95. 
297. Although article 25 is merely defmitional, it is central to the application of other 
articles of the CISG. See CISG, supra note 18, art 46 (buyer's right to the remedy of specific 
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on the contract delivery or payment date. Can the aggrieved party 
avoid the contract merely because the other party's performance is 
late? If not, then the contract is still in force, and the aggrieved party 
must sit back and await the other party's performance, with only a 
claim for damages resulting from the delay. If, in contrast, an 
avoidance right exists, then the aggrieved party has an immediate right 
to declare the contract avoided and is free to enter into a substitute 
transaction. Most commentators have taken the position that there is 
no avoidance right, typically observing that a slight delay in 
performance will not cause the detriment and substantial deprivation 
necessary for the breach to be fundamental.298 At some point, 
however, the delay in performance will become sufficiently substantial 
to constitute a fundamental breach. The problem for the aggrieved 
party is that she has no certain way of knowing exactly when that point 
has been reached. There is always the risk that the court may later 
decide that the attempted avoidance was improper because the seller's 
failure to deliver or the buyer's failure to pay was not yet sufficiently 
serious to warrant so severe a remedy. If the aggrieved party jumps 
the gun and declares the contract avoided before the breach has 
ripened into a fundamental breach, then she will have repudiated the 
contract and will discover, much to her chagrin, that she, too, is in 
breach.299 
performance); id. art. 49 (avoidance by the buyer); id. art. 51(2) (avoidance by the buyer 
when the seller has delivered only part of the goods or only part of the goods is 
nonconfonning); id. art. 64 (avoidance by the seller); id. art. 70 (relationship of fundamental 
breach and risk ofloss); id. art. 72 (avoidance for anticipatory breach); id. art. 73 (avoidance 
in the case of an installment contract). 
298. See, e.g., Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (1979), 
reprinted in JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HisroRY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SALES 404 (1989). ''This Convention specifically rejects the idea that in a 
commercial contract for the international sale of goods the buyer may, as a general rule, avoid 
the contract merely because the contract delivery date has passed and the seller has not as yet 
delivered the goods." Id., reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HlsTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra, at 429. 
It may be questioned, however, how often the buyer's failure to pay the price, take 
delivery of the goods or perform any of his other obligations under the contract and 
this Convention would immediately constitute a fundamental breach of contract if 
they were not performed on the date they were due. 
Id., reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES, 
supra, at 429. 
299. See infra notes 309-316 and accompanying text The anxiety that this situation 
creates is comparable to that suffered by a party who is forced to guess whether the other 
party's expression of inability or unwillingness to perform constitutes anticipatory 
repudiation. 
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The CISG's answer to the aggrieved party's dilemma is the 
German procedure of "Nachfrisf' in articles 47 and 63.300 The 
aggrieved party is permitted to "fix an additional period of time of 
reasonable length for performance" by the breaching party.301 If the 
goods are not delivered or the price not paid by the Nachfrist deadline, 
or if the breaching party declares that she will not perform as 
demanded, the aggrieved party can avoid the contract without concern 
for whether the breach was actually :fundamental.302 The Nachfrist 
procedure, therefore, enables either party to make time of the essence 
where the contract itself is silent, and to eliminate uncertainty whether 
the delay amounts to a fundamental breach. 
What relevance does this have to domestic law? Many disputes 
in contemporary contract law involve the right of the aggrieved party 
to terminate the contract and sue for total breach. In these 
circumstances, the Second Restatement of Contracts articulates what 
has been described as a "sensible two-step analysis."303 The first step 
is to ascertain whether or not a breach is material. If it is, the 
aggrieved party is permitted to suspend performance.304 The 
determination of whether a breach is material must be made in the 
light of the contract circumstances of each case, including the extent to 
which the breach will deprive the aggrieved party of what she is 
300. See CISG, supra note 18, arts. 47, 63. Section 326 of the Gennan Civil Code 
provides in part: 
(1) If, in the case of a mutual contract, one party is in default in 
performing, the other party may give him a reasonable period within which to 
perform his part with a declaration that he will refuse to accept the performance 
after the expiration of the period. After the expiration of the period he is entitled to 
demand compensation for non-performance, or to withdraw from the contract, if 
the performance has not been made in due time; the claim for performance is 
barred. 
§ 326(1) BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (F.R.G.), translated in THE GERMAN Crvrr. CoDE 53 
(Ian S. Forrester et al. trans., 1975). 
301. CISG, supra note 18, art. 47(1) (buyer's Nachfrist right); id. art. 63(1) (seller's 
Nachfrist right). 
302. See id. art. 49{l)(b). While the Nachfrist procedure applies to all of the buyer's 
and seller's obligations, it is a predicate for avoidance only if the seller has not delivered, see 
id., or the buyer has failed to pay the price or take delivery of the goods. See id. art. 64(l)(b). 
The procedure would, therefore, serve no useful purpose when used with respect to 
contractual duties other than the foregoing. 
303. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 8.15, at633 {2d ed. 1990). Of course, 
this is not necessarily an unbiased opinion, coming as it does from the reporter for the project 
As will soon be apparent, if the contract is covered by the Code, the consequences of a 
breach may be significantly different from those that follow from the breach of a non-Code 
contract See infra notes 304-313 and accompanying text For the sake of clarity, the 
discussion is, therefore, limited at this point to the latter type of contract 
304. See REsrATEMENT(SECOND) OFCoNTRACTS § 237 (1981). 
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entitled to expect under the contract.305 The second step in the analysis 
occurs when the aggrieved party makes the decision to terminate the 
contract. Under the terminology of the Second Restatement, the 
breach must be ''total" to warrant this response.306 The difficulties 
mount because not every material breach is automatically a total 
breach. This is true in those instances in which the breaching party 
can cure the breach by remedying the deficiency in performance.307 
As the comment to section 242 of the Second Restatement plainly 
states, the party in breach must ordinarily be afforded some 
opportunity to cure before termination is justified.308 How long is the 
period of time between suspension and termination? Here, again, 
there is no simple test to apply, and the aggrieved party who 
announces that the contract is at an end does so at her peril.309 
The aggrieved party's rights when there has been a delay in the 
other party's performance have historically been troublesome, and are 
troublesome still. Cases in which the contract states that ''time is of 
the essence" pose relatively few problems; unless there is some reason 
to question whether this phrase accurately reflects the intention of the 
parties, any delay will constitute a material and total breach.310 In 
305. A list of significant circumstances can be found in section 241 of the Second 
Restatement. See id. § 241. · 
306. See id. §§ 236-243. 
307. See id. § 237 ("[I]t is a condition of each party's remaining duties to render 
performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured 
material failure by the other party to render any such performance due at an earlier time."). 
See generally William H. Lawrence, Cure After Breach of Contract Under the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts: An Analytical Comparison with the Uniform Commercial Code, 70 
MINN. L. REv. 713 (1986) (comparing common-law and UCC treatments of cure). 
308. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNrRAcrs § 242 cmt. a ("Ordinarily there is 
some period of time between suspension and discharge, and during this period a party may 
cure his failure."); see also Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material 
Breach-Common Law Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 553, 594 (stating that the Second Restatement "attempt[s] to 
lessen the impact of the material breach doctrine" by providing that the aggrieved party may 
only suspend her ''Performance until it is too late for the breaching party to cure the default''). 
309. The point is made by Professor Farnsworth, who explains that if the aggrieved 
party "acts precipitously and terminates before it is entitled to do so loses its defense, as well 
as its claim for damages for total breach, and will itself be liable for damages for total 
breach." FARNSWORTH, supra note 303, § 8.18, at 643; see also Walker & Co. v. Harrison, 81 
N.W.2d 352, 355 (Mich. 1957) (stating that the decision to suspend and terminate "is fraught 
with peril, for should such determination, as viewed by a later court in the calm of its 
contemplation, be unwarranted, the repudiator himself will have been guilty of material 
breach and himself have become the aggressor, not an innocent victim"). Whether the 
material breach has ripened into a total breach depends on circumstances similar to those that 
are relevant to the materiality of the breach in the first place. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CoNTRACTS § 242. 
310. This is the position accepted by the Second Restatement: 
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contrast, if the contract is silent and is not for the sale of goods, courts 
have routinely concluded that time is not of the essence.311 Thus, there 
can be no termination without giving the breaching party a chance to 
cure. The problem for the aggrieved party is obvious; how much 
delay must she tolerate before she is free to look elsewhere for 
performance? 
We can approach this problem by looking at an illustration drawn 
from the Second Restatement: 
A contracts to build a house for B for $50,000, progress payments to be 
made monthly in an amount equal to 85% of the price of the work 
performed during the preceding month, the balance to be paid on the 
architect's certificate of satisfactory completion of the house. Without 
justification B fails to make a $5,000 progress payment. A thereupon 
stops work on the house and a week goes by. A's failure to continue the 
work is not a breach and B has no claim against A. B's failure to make 
the progress payment is an uncured material failure of performance 
which operates as the non-occurrence of a condition of A's remaining 
duties of performance under the exchange. If B offers to make the 
delayed payment and in all the circumstances it is not too late to cure 
the material breach, A's duties to continue the work are not discharged. 
A has a claim against B for damages for partial breach because of the 
delay.312 
Here, unfortunately, A has no sure way to know when she is free to 
leave the job and employ her assets elsewhere. The Second 
Restatement builds on this illustration with another: 
B tenders the progress payment after a two-day delay along with 
damages for the delay. A refuses to accept the payment and resume 
work and notifies B that he cancels the contract. B's tender cured his 
breach before A's remaining duties to render performance were 
discharged, and B has a claim against A for total breach of contract, 
It is, of course, open to the parties to make perfonnance or tender by a stated date a 
condition by their agreement, in which event, absent excuse, delay beyond that 
date results in discharge. Such stock phrases as ''time is of the essence" do not 
necessarily have this effect, although ... they are to be considered along with other 
circumstances in detennining the effect of delay. 
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 cmt d (citations omitted). 
311. See, e.g., Kakalik v. Bernardo, 439 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Conn. 1981); Freeman v. 
Boyce, 661 P.2d 702, 705-06 (Haw. 1983); Leavitt v. Fowler, 391 A.2d 876, 877-78 (N.H. 
1978). Unless the contract is an installment contract, the Code permits cancellation if one 
party's perfonnance is late. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1998) (allowing the buyer to reject the 
goods if"the tender of delivery fail[s] in any respect to confonn to the contract''); id. § 2-711 
(allowing the buyer to cancel following rejection); id. § 2-703 (allowing the seller to cancel if 
the buyer fails to make payment when due). 
312. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 illus. 1 (emphasis added). 
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subject to a claim by A againstB for damages for partial breach because 
of the delay.313 
Just like that, the innocent victim has himself become the bad person 
with responsibility for the more serious breach. How long should A 
have waited? Five days? Ten days? There is simply no way to know. 
Perhaps, then, our system should adopt a procedure like Nachfrist and 
permit a party in the position of A to make time of the essence by 
fixing an additional reasonable period of time after which she can 
safely declare the contract avoided if the other party has not 
performed. A procedure that encourages fixing such a deadline is 
attractive, in that it should reduce the inefficiencies that result from the 
uncertainty that plagues the present system. · 
One other useful context for the Nachfrist procedure bears 
mention. Not all agreements contain a provision for the time of 
performance. Suppose, for example, that in a contract for the sale of 
goods the parties do not agree, expressly or impliedly, on the time for 
delivery.314 In such cases, section 2-309(1) provides that the time for 
delivery shall be a "reasonable time."315 What is a reasonable time? 
There is no mechanical test to make this determination. The answer 
will vary from case to case, depending on such factors as ''the nature 
of goods to be delivered, the purpose for which they are to be used, the 
extent of seller's knowledge of buyer's intentions, transportation 
conditions, the nature of the market, and so on."316 The buyer must 
thus wait for the seller's performance without ever being sure when 
she has the right to cancel the contract because a reasonable time for 
delivery has expired. The buyer's position would be strengthened if 
she could rely on aNachfrist-type notice given to the seller. 
In summary, the Nachfrist procedure can improve an aggrieved 
party's ability to declare the contract canceled in the event of 
nonperformance, especially in instances in which the contract does not 
state that time is of the essence. Hence, it is reasonable to posit that 
once this procedure has been duly tested by experience in international 
sales, it will gradually creep into domestic commercial practice and its 
use will actually be encouraged by courts. 
313. Id. § 242 illus. 1 (emphasis added). 
314. Nor is there an applicable usage of trade, course of performance, or course of 
dealing that can be used to fix a delivery date. 
315. See U.C.C. § 2-309(1) (1998). 
316. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 180, § 3-5, at 89 (footnotes omitted). 
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N. CONCLUSION 
This Article uses the CISG to illustrate situations in which the 
emerging international commercial code may play an important role in 
the long-term development of purely domestic commercial law. 
Although it has been accepted that international law has the potential 
to help shape the law.on a domestic level, this phenomenon has only 
been discussed in the context oflegislation.317 However, international 
instruments may also exert an influence on the behavior of judges 
greater than is commonly supposed. For it is surely the case that, in 
creating a new legal environment for decision making, these 
instruments are bound to mediate existing intellectual habits and 
encourage experimentation and growth in cases without an 
international character.318 
How much of an influence the instruments exert, and whether the 
judicial adoption of international perspectives can be squared with 
other goals or norms of domestic commercial law, remains to be 
explored. It is time to confront these issues directly so that legislators 
can reach a rational consensus when deciding how to respond to 
proposed international instruments. Once it is recognized that 
international law reform efforts involve not just international 
transactions, but domestic law, and, as a result, domestic transactions, 
legislative decisions can be seen to alter the fabric of modem 
commercial law, influencing an enormous range of substantive 
outcomes in the process. Efforts to ensure a clear understanding of 
this sort are among a wide range of steps designed to build a 
:framework within which international law can develop and grow 
without unexpectedly and inappropriately disturbing the domestic 
legal system. 
317. See, e.g., Boss, supra note 28. 
318. The process of mediation works two ways. Not only are international 
developments likely to color judicial perception of domestic law, but a judge's understanding 
of domestic Jaw is likely to have a similar influence on her application of international Jaw. 
Not surprisingly, this latter possibility has not gone unnoticed by commentators. See, e.g., 
HONNOLD, supra note 298, at I (stating that domestic tribunals ''will be subject to a natural 
tendency to read the international rules in light of the legal ideas that have been imbedded at 
the core of their intellectual formation"). 

